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ABSTRACT
RENT PAYMENT AND HOUSING CONSUMPTION PATTERNS OF
RENTER HOUSEHOLDS
by Hiroshi Ueno
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of
Master of City Planning, June, 1975
This is a study on how much of their income renter house-
holds are paying for their rent, and on housing expenditure
patterns of renter households.
The result of this study will serve three purposes: In
the first place, it will serve as a basic knowledge of renter
households' behavior on rent expenditure. Secondly, the result
will be helpful to see the effects of housing subsidy programs.
Thirdly, given a set of reasonable contribution rates, it will
serve in measuring the rent burden of household groups.
Two methods are adopted and used in this study. The first
is the review and re-examination of existing housing consumption
theories and of existing empirical works on housing consumption.
The second is the cross-tabulation analyses on housing expendi-
ture patterns of a one-out-of-a-hundred sample of renters in
the Boston SMSA, and the corresponding regression analyses based
on the same data of the Boston SMSA.
Rental expenditure patterns of renters by their income
and characteristics such as household size, sex and race of
head, and age of head are studied. In addition, regression
equations, which are stratified by household size to estimate
rent-income ratios of household groups are specified. Also,
basic information needed for running multiple regression
are specified for future analyses. Results are summarized
in the Conclusion section.
Several suggestions on further extension of this study
follow.
Thesis Supervisor: Joseph Ferreira
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban
Studies and Planning
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Without generous help from various individuals to whom
I am indebted, I alone could not have done this thesis. I
would like to express my sincere thanks to the following in-
dividuals.
First of all, I wish to express my thanks to Joseph
Ferreira, my thesis advisor, who gave me his accurate insight
on the topic and appropriate comments, and guided me towards
the final product. Tunney Lee, my academic advisor, always
provided me with countless suggestions, strategies, and en-
couragement, and allowed me to explore freely what I wanted.
Arthur Solomon, one of my readers, suggested to me the most
important material concerning this thesis and helped me in
constructing the structure and framework of the thesis at the
first stages. Langley Keyes, one of my readers, assisted me
to proceed and advance this work, especially in arranging in-
terviews. Bernard Frieden gave me the original idea of this
thesis and without his stimuli, I would have never reached
this theme.
So much for the above. I am also indebted to Wren McMains
and Gregory Barry, who were generous in making available to me
the EFFECT program and without whose help in the programming,
I could not have finished the computation. Mingche Li also
kindly offered me the tapes he had made from the Public Use
Sample of the 1970 U.S. Census, and allowed me to look at the
i
studies he had done.
There are several people in public agencies whose help
and information provided me with the opportunity to re-exam-
ine my results. Matt Hobbs of Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency generously made available his proposal on Idealized
Housing Subsidy Program. Martha Ringer of the State Welfare
Department provided me with information on the welfare pay-
ment. Mr. Saffadini of the Boston Housing Authority also pro-
vided me with the data on households in public housing.
I also appreciate very much Eileen Shapiro, who encour-
aged me to work on the theme I had chosen, and paid a great
deal of effort to inspect my crude manuscript. I am grateful
to Sandra Congleton, who typed this thesis in a short time
based on my illegible hand-draft.
Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Makiko Ueno, who
gave me much needed encouragement and invaluable support.
May 30, 1975 Hiroshi Ueno
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A. Products Resulting from This Study 2
B. Purposes 2
C. Method 4
II. HOW MUCH RENT TENANTS ARE PAYING: THEORIES
AND EMPIRICAL WORKS 6
A. Factors Influencing Housing Expenditure:
Qualitative Theory 6
A.l. Rent, income and price 6
a. Gross rent versus contract rent 6
b. Permanent income versus current
income 9
c. Disposable income versus gross
income 12
d. Price of housing 13
A.2. Household characteristics that in-
fluence housing consumption pattern 15
a. Household size 15
b. Age of head 15
c. Sex of head 16
d. Race of head 16
B. Price and Income: Quantitative Theory 18
B.1. Utility function and demand function 18
B.2. Two formulas of demand function 24
C. Empirical Work on Housing Consumption
Patterns of Renter Households and
Income Elasticity 28
C.l. Summary and analysis of studies by
M. Reid 30
a. Data base, concepts, and method 30
b. Effects of income on rent
expenditure 30
c. Effects of household character-
istics on rent expenditure 34
iii
C.2. Summary and analysis of studies by
N. Ekanem 39
a. Data base, method, and concepts
of Ekanem's study 39
b. Results of the first study of
Ekanem: effects of household
characteristics on rent-income
ratio 43
c. Ekanem's second study: income
and price elasticities 44
C.3. Summary and analysis of studies by
I. Lowry, J. DeSalvo, and B. Woodfill 47
a. Data, method, and concepts used
by Lowry, et.al. 50
b. Effects of income 50
c. Effects .of other household
characteristics 52
C.4. Summary and conclusion 56
a. Conclusions 56
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BOSTON SMSA: QUALITATIVE
ANALYSIS BY CROSS-TABULATION 61
A. Introduction 61
A.l. Objectives and questions 61
a. Objectives 61
b. Specific questions 62
A.2. Data, concepts, and methods 63
a. Data 63
b. Concepts 65
c. Modification of income elasticity 68
d. Target geographical area 70
e. Gross income 71
f. Method 72
B. Results of Cross-Tabulation 72
B.l. Effects of income 72
a. Role of income in consumption
behavior 73
iv
b. Income elasticity of housing
demand assuming constant prices 73
c. Intercept and regression formula 78
d. Income and household size 80
e. Elasticity and household size 81
f. Rent-income ratio of low-income
households 81
B.2. Effects of race and sex 83
a. Results 83.
b. Effects of public housing 86
B.3. Effects of household size 90
B.4. Effects of age of head 92
C. Cross-Table Analysis of Uncontrolled Data 94
C.l. Effects of income 95
a. Rent-income ratio and elasticity 100
C.2. Rent-income ratio and household size 104
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Conclusions on Housing Consumption Patterns
of Renter Household 106
B. Facts: How Much Rent Tenants Are Paying 113
C. A Comparison of What Renters Pay and What
Renters Should Pay 116
D. What Was Done in This Study and What
Remains to Be Researched 118
D.l. What was done in this study 118
D.2. What remains to be researched 120
APPENDIX A 122
BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
V
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
FIGURE II-1
FIGURE 11-2
FIGURE 11-3
FIGURE 11-4
FIGURE 11-5
FIGURE III-1-A
FIGURE III-1-B
FIGURE III-2-A
Probability Distributions of Current
Incomes and Permanent Incomes in One
Group of Households
Graphic Explanation of Utility
Maximization Theory
Rent-Income Ratio by Age of Head
and Annual Income by Age of Head
Gross Rent Expenditures as a Function
of Income
Gross Rent Expenditure as a Function
of Household Size
Average Rent-Income Ratio by Annual
Income Stratified by Household Size
(1 Person and 2 Person Households)
Average Rent-Income Ratio by Annual
Income Stratified by Household Size
(3-4 Person and 5-7 Person Households)
Average Annual Gross Rent by Income
Stratified by Household Size
(1 Person and 2 Person Households)
FIGURE III-2-B Average Annual Gross Rent by Income
Stratified by Household Size
(3-4 Person and 5-7 Person Households)
FIGURE 111-3
FIGURE 111-4
FIGURE 111-5
FIGURE 111-6
Rent-Income Ratio by Income Stratified
by Race and Sex
Annual Gross Rent by Income Stratified
by Race and Sex
Rent-Income Ratio by Size of Household
Stratified by Income
Rent-Income Ratio by Age of Head
Stratified by Income and Household Size
8
23
35
54
55
74
75
76
77
84
85
91
93
vi
FIGURE III-7-A Rent-Income Ratio by Annual Income
Stratified by Household Size
(1 Person and 2 Person Households) 97
FIGURE III-7-B Rent-Income Ratio by Annual Income
Stratified by Household Size
(3 Person, 4-5 Person, and 6-7 Person
Households)
FIGURE 111-8
FIGURE 111-9
98
99
Rent-Income Ratio and Annual Rent by
Annual Income
Rent-Income Ratio by Household Size
Stratified by Annual Income 105
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
TABLE II-1
TABLE 11-2
TABLE 11-3
TABLE II-4
TAB.LE 11-5
TABLE 11-6
TABLE III-1
TABLE 111-2
TABLE 111-3
TABLE III-4-A
TABLE III-4-B
TABLE 111-5
TABLE 111-6
TABLE IV-1
TABLE IV-2
Coefficients of Regression by M. Reid
Results of Multiple Regression by
M. Reid
Mean Housing Expenditure of the Eight
Income Categories under $10,000
Inter-Metropolitan Areas Income and
Price Elasticities of Hoising Demand
of Renters
Rent-Income Ratios as Functions of
Income and Household Characteristics:
Four Housing Submarkets in New York City,
1968
Research Characteristics and Conclusions
of the Three Studies
Number of Renter Households in the 1/100
Sample of Boston SMSA by Income and by
Household Size
Definition of Variables
Income Elasticity of Housing Demand
Households with Income $4,000-$6,000
(Data Set A)
Households with Income $2,000-$4,000
(Data Set B)
Rent-Income Ratio Regression Results
Income Elasticity by Household Size and
by Annual Income
Conclusions about Housing Consumption
and Household Characteristics
Rent-Income Ratio (%) by Income and
by Household Size
viii
31
32
37
45
51
57
64
66
69
89
89
101
103
107
115
TABLE IV-3
TABLE A-1
TABLE A-2
TABLE A-3
TABLE A-4
TABLE A-5
TABLE A-6
TABLE A-7
Comparison of What Tenants Are Paying
and What Tenants Should Pay
Computation of Number of Renter House-
holds with Income below $6,000 and with
Head of Male and Female, in the City
of Boston
Computation of Number of Renter House-
holds in Public Housing, with Income
below $6,000 and with Head of Male and
Female, in the City of Boston
Probability of Living in Public Hous-
ing for Renters with Income below
$6,000 by Race and Sex of Head,'in
the City of Boston
Average Rent-Income Ratios of All
Renters with Income from $4,000 to
$6,000 by Race and Sex of Head, in
the Boston SMSA
Adjusted Rent-Income Ratio of All
Renters with Income from $4,000 to
$6,000 by Race and Sex of Head, in
the Boston SMSA
Average Rent-Income Ratios of All
Renters with Income from $2,000 to
$4,000 by Race and Sex of Head, in
the Boston SMSA
Adjusted Rent-Income Ratio of All
Renters with Income from $2,000 to
$4,000 by Race and Sex of Head, in
the Boston SMSA
ix
117
123
124
125
127
127
128
128
11. INTRODUCTION
This is a study on how much of their incomes renter
households are paying for their rent, and on renter house-
holds' behavior concerning housing consumption; that is to
say, the emphasis is on the effects of household character-
istics on housing expenditures. There are two pressing
reasons for pursuing this study.
In the first place, a direct housing assistance pro-
gram, sometimes called a "housing allowance" program, re-
quires us to set up a fair contribution rate for partici-
pants in the program. One of the first steps to develop
reasonable contribution rates will be a study of housing
consumption patterns of households.
The second issue is the consideration of equity in
housing subsidy allocation. Equitable allocation of sub-
sidy funds is a recent concern among housing researchers.1
Equitable allocation should be based on housing deprivations.
One of the most important housing deprivations is the rent
burden. In order to measure rent burden, one must know how
much tenants are actually paying for their rent.
lFor example, H. Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1972, and A.
Solomon, Housing the Urban Poor, MIT Press, Cambridge,
1974.
2I-A. Products Resulting from this Study
The direct objectives of this study will be well de-
fined by stating the products of this study. There are two
products, which are:
1) An empirical model of renter households' behavior
with regard to housing consumption, and
2) A table of how much rent tenants pay by household
size and income, or regression equations to esti-
mate how much rent tenants pay.
I-B. Purposes
There are several reasons why the development of these
products is necessary. First, to design an equitable hous-
ing program, it is necessary to set up a reasonable contri-
bution rate for each type of household, as mentioned before.
The conventional 25 percent (of income) contribution rate
is too rough to be equitable.2 Reasonable contribution
rates should be based on how much renters can afford to pay
for rent. This is a question that is difficult to answer,
but it-is possible to answer the question of how much rents
tenants of various types are paying at present. What they
can afford to pay could be higher or lower than the present
rent, however this study will show how renter households
2I. Lowry, Rental Housing in New York Cit , the New York
City Rand Institute, New York City, 1971, p. 140.
3will behave on rent expenditure under the present conditions.
Although the nowledge of renter's behavior is not directly
related to what they should pay, without the basic knowledge
of.renter's behavior on rent expenditure, it would be diffi-
Cult to establish criteria on what they should pay.
Secondly, a direct cash assistance housing program re-
quires a model of renter behavior in order to predict the
effects of the program. If the characteristics of a house-
hOld and amount of its direct cash assistance are known,
One can estimate how much the household will pay for rent,
u1ing the result of this study of households' behavior.
Thirdly, as stated above, quantitative measurements of
rent burden are necessary to establish an equitable housing
subsidy allocation. If we have a reasonable contribution
rktbe as given; for instance, standard budgets of low-and
mOderate-income households estimated by Bureau of Labor Sta-
tigties, results of this study (that is, how much rent ten-
@At &re paying) will show the degree of rent burdens borne
by the Various types of households. For example, such ques-
tiens as, "Do aged households have a rent burden?" and,
"HoW Much of a burden do they have?" could be answered by
the @Ofmbination of this study and a rent burden criterion.
Egtimbates of rent burden could be used as one of the indi-
datCos by which households could be judged to be assisted
by & housing program.
4I-C. Method
To develop the two products described in section I-A,
the following two methods have been adopted:
1) Review and re-examination of existing housing con-
sumption theories and existing empirical works on
housing consumption, and
2) Development of graphs based on various tables derived
from controlled and uncontrolled data,3 and regres-
sions of some of those tabulated data.
Chapter II examines existing theories and empirical
works. Section II-A reviews and discusses both the exist-
ing qualitative theories on household behavior in household
consumption and some important concepts in studying housing
expenditure. Section II-B reviews and analyzes existing
quantitative theories on housing consumption. Section II-C
reviews and criticizes existing empirical works on household
behavior with regard to housing consumption and draws con-
clusions about household behavior, based on the re-examina-
tion of the literature.
Chapter III studies household behavior with regard to
housing consumption using new data of the Boston SMSA, ex-
tracted from the Public Use Sample of the 1970 U.S. Housing
3
",Controlled" and "uncontrolled" tables will be ex-
plained in Chapter III.
5Census. Section III-A discusses specific objectives of the
Boston study, the data and concepts used, and the methods.
Section III-B analyzes the results of the cross-tabulations
based on the controlled data. Section III-C analyzes the
results of cross-tabulations and regressions based on the
uncontrolled data.
Chapter IV contains the conclusions of this thesis
based on Chapter II and Chapter III. Section IV-A summar-
izes the findings and postulates housing consumption models.
Section IV-B summarizes the results of the research on how
much rent tenants pay. Section IV-C tries to see an impli-
cation of this study on rent burden. In the final section,
IV-D, what was accomplished by this study and what remains
for further research are discussed as a conclusion.
6II. HOW MUCH RENT TENANTS ARE PAYING: THEORIES AND
EMPIRICAL WORKS
II-A. Factors Influencing Housing Expenditure: Qualitative
Theory
II-A-l. Rent, income and price
a. Gross rent versus contract rent
Housing consumption is generally thought to include a
package of goods, including the physical structure and
various services and other amenities. In other words, hous-
ing is more than simply a physical shelter or space, it is
a comprehensive concept. Therefore, in addition to costs
included in contract rent, utility expenditures for water,
electricity, gas, fuel, etc. and possibly transportation
costs should be included in a measure of housing expendi-
ture. Utility expenditures vary by region because of vari-
ous factors such as winter temperature or average income
of a region.1
Gross rent is a more appropriate indicator of housing
expenditure than contract rent. However, one must remember
that .even if gross rents are the same among a group of
families, what each household gets may be considerably dif-
For example, see M. Reid, Housing and Income, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1962, pp.46-I7.
7ferent. Some households may have less spacious housing of
good quality, while the others may have low quality housing
with relatively large sizes. In addition, some households
may have furnished housing with such conveniences as dish-
washers, air conditioning, refrigerators or other furniture,
while others may be paying for unfurnished housing.
b. Permanent income versus current income
Several studies have indicated that a family is likely
to determine the level of its housing expenditures based on
its "anticipated average income over time" rather than cur-
rent income. This "anticipated average income over time"
or "long-run expected income"2 is also called permanent in-
come in general. The concept that is needed in determining
housing expenditure is purchasing power. Permanent income
represents earning power but neglects wealth considerations;
therefore, it does not accurately represent purchasing
power. However, permanent income is generally regarded as
a better measurement than current income.
The concept of permanent income was proposed by Milton
Friedman. Friedman states that the current income of a
consumer unit (Y c) consists of two components; a permanent
component (Yp), which is the amount a consumer unit believes
that it could consume while maintaining its wealth intact,
M. Reid, Op. cit., p. 10.
8and a transitory component (Y t). Friedman postulates that
Y = Y + Y .3
-c p t.
in explanation, Friedman states that:
The permanent component is to be interpreted
-as reflecting the effect of those factors
that the unit regards as determining its capi-
tal value or wealth: the non-human wealth it
owns; the personal attributes of the earners
in the unit, such as their training, ability,
personality; the attributes of the economic
activity of the earners, such as the occupa-
tion followed, the location of the economic
activity, and so on. It is analogous to the
"expected" value of a probability distribution.
The transitory component is to be interpreted
as reflecting all "other" factors, factors
that are likely to be treated by the unit af-
fected as "accidenta" or "chance" occurrences...
In statistical data, the transitory component
includes also chance errors of measurement... 4
If we use this definition, however, we are still not
zure how to measure permanent income empirically. One as-
sumption underlying this definition is important to make
the permanent income concept clear. He stated, just before
this definition, that
...suppose Mr. A's measured income in any
period is decidedly lower than the average
measured income of a group of individuals who
are similar to him in characteristics that we
have reason to believe affect potential earn-
ings significantly--for example, age, occupa-
tion, race, and location. It then seems reason-
able to suppose that Mr. A's measured income
understates his permanent income.
3M. Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function,
p. 10, p. 21.
4Ibid.
9For any considerable group of consumer units,
the resulting transitory components tend to
average out, so that if they, alone, accounted
for the discrepancies between permanent and
measured income, the mean measured income of
the group would equal the mean permanent com-
ponent, and the mean transitory component would
be zero.
5
The following picture (Figure II-1) may be helpful to
understand this statement.
L(Relative likelyhood)
Probability Distribution of
Permanent Income
Probability Distribution of
Current Income
Y (Current or Per-
manent Income)
Figure II-1. Probability Distributions of Current
Incomes and Permanent Incomes In
One Group of Households.
Note that the permanent income distribution is more con-
centrated, but both permanent and current income distri-
bution have the same mean.
5M. Friedman, Op. cit. pp. 21-22.
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If a demographic group of households is defined small
enough and precisely enough to suppose those households are
really homogeneous in every characteristic with respect to
incomes, then the permanent income of a household in the
group is the same as the average current incomes of the
group. Namely, the deviation of current income of a unit
from the average current income of the group is totally at-
tributable to the transitory income of the unit. This is
a common assumption among researchers who used a concept of
permanent income.
Friedman's second postulate is that permanent income
and transitory income are uncorrelated with one another.6
The assumption implies that if we take a random sample of
households from a particular demographic group, the house-
holds with higher current incomes are more likely to have
positive transitory incomes. This bias toward average posi-
tive transitory income for high-income households drives
estimates of income elasticity based on current in-
comes downward, as compared to those estimates that are
based. on permanent income. Because of this bias created
by using current income, it is generally accepted among
researchers that households' behavior in housing consump-
tion should be based on their permanent income. There are,
M. Reid, Op. cit., p. 10.
11
however, several problems associated with the permanent in-
coe concept. First, the procedure for estimating the per-
manent income of a household is not well defined by Friedman.
Definition of groups or definition of computation forms are
left to each researcher. The lack of concensus causes prob-
lems, because each researcher defines permanent income by
his own method, thus making it hard to compare the results
of the various researchers. There are two major methods
used to define permanent income: to take an average of
time series data of individuals or to take the average cur-
rent income of a group at one point in time. The results
.of these methods differ from each other considerably.
There is also the problem of data gathering. To ga-
ther time series data of individuals requires a great deal
of work. Therefore, most researchers use the group average
method of estimating permanent income. For the purpose of
unaking such estimates, however, they have to have groups
sufficiently small that they can be assumed to be homogen-
eous in terms of earning powers. Since it is almost im-
possible to disaggregate data into such small groups, most
researchers use fairly large groups for their data clusters.
Those large groups, in fact, average out substantial varia-
tions in earning powers of households in the group. Conse-
quently, estimated permanent incomes are too concentrated
to the middle-income level.
12
In summary, past theoretical writings and past studies
suggest that permanent income estimates based on time series
individual data are the most reliable for a study on housing
consumption behavior but difficult to measure.
c. Disposable income versus gross income
Among families whose gross incomes are the same, actual
disposable incomes which can be used for consumption vary
widely, depending on the source of incomes, because of the
federal and local tax structures and differences in work re-
lated expenses such as commuting costs. If gross income
were used to study rent-income ratios, then non-taxable in-
come such as welfare payments would be treated in the same
way as taxable income such as wage. This would cause rent-
income ratios of households with non-taxable incomes to
appear to be higher than the ratios of those with taxable
incomes. Therefore, a better measure of purchasing power
is disposable income. I. Lowry also recommends the use of
disposable income in order to define a household's ability
to pay rent. In his report, submitted to the City of New
York, Lowry's definition of disposable income is gross in-
come minus taxes, work-related expenses, and involuntary
insurance.7 This definition of disposable income is mean-
I. Lowry, Rental Housing in New York City, The New
York City Rand Institute, 1971, p. 135.
13
ingful and workable.
One problem associated with estimating disposable in-
come Is how to measure total taxes paid, work-related ex-
penses and involuntary insurance.
d. Price of housing
In addition to household income, price is one of the
most influential factors in housing expenditures. Price
varies by region and by sector in an SMSA. To measure the
price of housing, one needs to be able to measure the quan-
tity of housing. In most cases, housing quantity is meas-
ured by either total floor space or number of rooms in a
unit.. Neither measure is a rich enough measure of housing
quantity to be satisfactory by itself.
In general, to determine how price varies by location,
rents of units with the same structural characteristics
such as same size, same type, same age, etc., but which are
located in different sectors are compared to obtain rela-
tive pirices of various units of housing. One problem in
determining these relative prices is that, since housing in
different locations differ from each other, it is hard to
find comparable housing units in various sectors.
The effects of price on housing demand are generally
described by the following:
H = (Y )B -B2 (2.1)
14
where
H = quantity of housing demanded by a house-
hold i
Y = income of a household i
P = price of housing in the area
Q( = coefficient
B = income elasticity
B2 = price elasticity
If the price elasticity is unity, (2.1) can be transformed
into
B1, = HiP = C e(Y )B (2.2)
where
R = rental expenditure or rental cost of
household i
2bis assumption of unity price elasticity implies that,
e-ven though housing consumptions vary as to the price of
bonsing changes, rental expenditures are kept constant.
Saih an assumption solves the problem of price measurement.
For studies such as this one, which focus on the ef-
fects of household characteristics, including income, the
above assumption greatly facilitates the process of the
research and is not inconsistent with empirical findings.
15
II-A-2. Household Characteristics that Influence Housing
Consumption Pattern
The variables that are briefly reviewed in this sec-
tion are those which have already been revealed in existing
studies to have effects on housing expenditures. There
could be other minor variables which may have effects; how-
ever, the major ones are the following four variables, in
addition to income and price, which have already been dis-
cussed.
a. Household size
Household size, i.e., number of persons in a household,
is expected to have effects on housing consumption. One
theory says that household size has negative effects on hous-
ing consumption because any additional person in a household
tends to increase food consumption and other costs more than
housing. Explanations in support of this theory are that
two or three persons can share one room, and also that fami-
lies can find larger units without increasing rents by choos-
ing units in low quality structures or in low quality com-
munities.
b. Age of head
It is commonly said that elderly households have exces-
sively high housing expenditures. One explanation is that
8 M. Reid, Op. cit., p. 69.
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elderly families prefer to live in good quality housing.
Another example of driving the ratio of aged households high
is that aged households tend to have less current income but
relatively more wealth than younger households. At the same
time, households with young heads are revealed in some re-
searches 9 to be paying high rents, although this finding is
not commonly accepted among researchers.
c. Sex of head
It is also generally accepted that female-headed house-
holds are paying relatively high rent. An explanation in
support of this theory is that females tend to put a high
value on security; therefore, they tend to occupy high rent
units. Another explanation for this is that discrimination
against female-headed families may force them to live in
high rent units instead of standard units.
d. Race of head
The race of the head of a household is also supposed
to have effects on housing expenditures. Contrary to the
common expectation, researchers have found that white house-
holds.pay higher rents than non-white households. One ex-
planation of this is that there is discrimination against
non-white households, which forces non-white households to
9For example, I. Lowry, Op. cit., p. 71.
17
live in deteriorated neighborhoods where relatively inex-
pensive units exist. As a consequence, such discrimina-
tion decreases rents by lowering housing quality. Another
explanation is that white households prefer to live in
high quality housing.
18
II-B. Price and Income: Quantitative Theory
In this section, a basic economic theory of housing ex-
penditures of every household is presented and discussed. Be-
fore considering empirical research, a discussion about the
theoretical model of household behavior is presented, and the
implications of this model on housing expenditures is discus-
sed, in order to clarify the hypotheses that empirical resear-
chers should test. The discussion of the model includes con-
sideration of the utility function of households, their implied
housing demand function and the income elasticity of demand for
housing.
II-B-1 Utility function and demand function
The theory of household rent expenditures presented in
this thesis is based on the household's utility maximization
theory, which, in turn, has been derived from neoclassic eco-
nomics description of how individuals decide what goods and
services to purchase, in terms of utility function of the pur-
chased items. Utility is defined as the satisfaction indivi-
duals obtain through purchasin'g various goods and services.
The same theory may be applied to households. Each household,
assumed to be "rational", will try to purchase goods and ser-
vices in order to maximize its total satisfaction subject to
its income constraint. The simplest form of utility or satis-
19
faction is described by a Cobb-Douglas type utility function:
U = H .X (1-0(i) (2.3)
where
U = total utility of the ith type of household
H = quantity of housing services
X = quantity of non-housing goods and services
O( i = coefficient which represents the degree of
preference and which has a value between 0
and 1.0
The income constraint is described by the following function:
Yi = PhH + P X , (2.4)
where
Y = income of the household
Ph = price of housing H
P = price of other goods and services X,
From these two equations, the quantity of housing (H i) purchas-
ed by the household can be derived. In addition, by multiply-
ing Hi by Ph 1, the housing expenditure to income ratio can
also be derived from (2.4) as follows:
Y -PhH
X p (2.5)
Substituting (2.5) for X in equation (2.3) we get:
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U =H i H (
iHi( p (2.6)
x
The total utility of the household in terms of housing quanti-
ty can be maximized1 by setting
DHUi
yielding:
{ H i 1 ,Yi PhHi
P
+ H .(-(' )- hH = 0 (2.7)
Multiplying (2.7) by
H __ hH
we get
((Yi-Ph H)-H (1( )-Ph =0,
or
H(-i - Ph -h +P h +*+ Y= 0..
Thus ,
H =i i
P h
Hi Q-(Y) (P) (2.8)
R = HiPh i' i, and (2.9)
1 Nkanta F. Ekanem, The Demand for Housing: An Analysis by
Family Type, The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 2.
H P
R = 1 h 
.1
Y Yg i'
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(2.10)
where
R = rental expenditure.
As shown above, a housing demand function (2.8), a
housing expenditure equation (2.9), and the rent-income
ratio equation (2.10) can be derived from the special Cobb-
Douglas type utility function. Equations (2.9) and (2.10)
imply that housing expenditure of the. ith type of household
is always a constant proportion of that household's income.
In other words, the housing expenditure-income ratio is con-
stant for all households of ith type, regardless of their
incomes. Equation (2.8) also implies that the income elas-
ticity of housing demand is +1 and the price elasticity is
-1.
The general Cobb-Douglas type utility function is
given by
U = i Y- 1 i2 (2.11)
If an ith
constraint
.;
type household maximizes its utility under the
of its income, then
.i hH ,2 .H
+( , i hH)-ph 0 (2.12)i 12 \ P P .
Using the same procedure described in (2.7) through (2.10),
we can obtain a housing demand function and a housing expen-
diture-income ratio equation as follows: 22
Hi =(){ *(Yi)(P '( il 4 2)- (2.13)
Since rent R = Pi Hi, C2.13) can be rewritten in terms of house-
hold rent-income ratio so that
11 11 12) (2.14)
where (Ri (R)
Y J Y ,-
As illustrated in equations (2.13) and .(2.14), the general
Cobb-Douglas type utility function suggests the same housing
expenditure pattern as the special Cobb-Douglas type utility
function does: namely, that the housing expenditure-income
ratio is constant, and that the income elasticity and price
elasticity are unity; i.e., +1 and -1, respectively. That is:
(i =Q , (2.15)
Eh = +1, and (2.16)
y
Eh = -1, (2.17)
p
where
Eh = income elasticity of housing demand
y
Eh = price elasticity of housing demand
p
i 11 11i, Di+ 0(i2)*
A summary of equations (2.1) through (2.17) is contained
in Figure 11-2.
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Figure 11-2. Graphic Explanation of
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II-B-2. Two formulae of demand function
We have just shown that Cobb-Douglas utility functions
imply unitary income and price elasticities and constant rent-
income ratios. Although these rent-income ratios are constant
for each household, the theory does in general allow 0A,, a
housing preference coefficient, that is, the rent-income ra-
tioto vary by household types.
The coefficientc( , which represents the degree of pre-
ference, is dependent on household type. Thus, C(' can be a
function of household characteristics. ( can be described
in the following two ways, depending on whether one assumes
an additive or multiplicative effect of the various character-
istics,
0 = 0 + 1 .C 1 + L 2.C 2+... (2.18)
or
d1 d2 )(3
C = Q.OC .C2  .C ... (2.19)
where
C ,C2C3... = household characteristics
such as number of persons in
a household or race of head
O ,Y2 ... = coefficients which represent
the degree of preference
Rearranging equation (2.15) leads to
R =i( .Y . (2.20)
Substituting (2.18) and (2.19) for (i contained in (2.20),
we write
housing expenditure as: 25
R = Y(C + Cl+'2C2+....), (2.21)
or
CX 1 2 (33R =j -Y C 2 .C 3  (2.22)
These formulae represent two theoretical expressions of
housing expenditure, used in conjunction with Cobb-Douglas
utility functions. Note that both forms assume that the effect
of household characteristics will be to adjust the percentage
of income devoted to rent. The difference lies in how the
various characteristics (e.g., family size) interact. If all
the Ci's were dummy variables, their definition could be ad-
justed so that (2.20) and (2.22) are equivalent.
One basic problem with the Cobb-Douglas utility function
approach stems from the unity elasticity assumption: Empirical
research2 suggests that income and price elasticities are not
unity but are somewhat less than 1.0 and slightly greater than
-1.0, respectively. An alternative housing demand function
that permits such assumption is
B -B2
Hi =Ci)Y i) . (P 2 (2.23)
B 1-B 2
which implies that R =NY(Y±) .(P 2, (2.24)
2For example, see T.H. Lee, "Housing and Permanent In-
come: Tests Based on a Three-Year Reinterview Survey," Review
Economics and Statistics, 1968, pp. 480-490.
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where
B and B2 = the income and price elasticities
which are values between +1 and 0.
Note that (2.23) is a Cobb-Douglas type demand function. If
B = B2 = 1, we have the same demand function as before.
Substituting (2.18) and (2.19) for of (2.214) gives
us the new set of housing expenditure formulae, as expressed
in (2.25) and (2.26):
- B ()1-Bc
R = Y ( 0+ 0 C 1+ 0 C2+...).(P) 2 (2.25)
B 1  0( fa2 c 3 1-B2R = 0* Y .C 3C C ... (P) (2.26)
Equation (2.26) is a purely theoretical form of the
housing demand function of a household. Although economists
use various formulae of the demand function, the form from
which the other equations are derived is described by (2.26)9.
In addition, because (2.26) has a log-linear form, it is a
convenient formula for estimating income and price elastici-
ties through use of a regression analysis.
Though (2.26) is the most utilized form of the housing de-
3 For example, N. Ekanem, Op. cit., F. DeLeeuw, "The De-
mand for Housing: A Review of Cross-Section Evidence," The
Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 1971, and G.
Carliner, "Income Elasticity of Housing Demand," The Review
of Economics and Statistics, February, 1973.
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mand function, some researchers prefer the following special
type demand function (2.27) for use in situations in which
the price is constant:
R = C50+ Y 1.Y+Y.( 2 *C 1+ 3 .C2 + .C3 ''') * (2.27)
This formula is useful for four reasons. First, the results
it predicts seem to fit the empirical data. 5  Second, it is
easier to interpret results of this formula than those of the
log-linear form. Third, the formula allows us to do regres-
sion analysis. Fourth, this formula still maintains the im-
portant characteristic of Y.% i: that is, that the effects
of every household characteristic is always multiplied by the
household's income. However, the theoretical justification
of this formula has not yet been satisfactorily shown.
The major differences between the two formulae as ex-
pressed in (2.26) and (2.27) are: whether it has a constant
term, and whether income elasticity is constant or variable.
The first difference is clearly seen in equations (2.26) and
(2.27). In order to understand the second difference, the in-
come elasticity of (2.27) must be derived,6
14
For example, J. Morgan, "Housing and Ability to Pay,"
Econometrica, April, 1965, and I. Lowry, et al, Rental Hous-
ing in New York City, The New York City Rand Institute, 1971.
5 See Ira S. Lowry, Op. cit., p. 229.
6An income elasticity is defined as percentage differ-
ence in housing expenditure divided by percentage difference
in income. Mathematically, it is defined as:
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ER R YY 16Y R)
L( 1+d2'C1 3'*C 2 ').Y (2.28)
0 0(91+0(2.Cl r3.C2+...).Y
where
E = income elasticity of housing demand
This derivation (2.28) illustrates that the income elasticity
is variable instead of constant, namelythe income elasticity
of (2.27) is small at the low-income stage and then gradually
increases close to 1.0 as income goes up, while the income
elasticity of (2.26) has a constant value of.--B .
II-C. Empirical Work on Housing Consumption Patterns of Ren-
ter Households and Income Elasticity
There exist several empirical studies that focus on hous-
ing expenditure models. However, the results of those.studies
on housing consumption vary widely. In this section, the ma-
jor empirical efforts on this subject are reviewed and compar-
ed, and several hypotheses are developed from those studies.
In the next section, those hypotheses are examined using data
from the 1970 U.S. Census.
ER .6 R aY
Y R Y
orER 
_ R .Y
Y SY R
where
R = incremental increase in housing expenditure
Y = incremental increase in income.
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Most works in the field of housing expenditures look at
both the rent-income relation of renters and the housing ex-
penditure-income relation of homeowners. In this paper, how-
ever, the rent-income relation of renters will be the main
focus, because the housing expenditure of homeowners is hard
to measure accurately and varies widely; therefore, it re-
quires us lots of "courageous" assumptions to estimate hous-
ing expenditure of homeowners.
On the other hand, the gross rent of renters is easy to
measure and is a relatively fair indicator of the housing ex-
penditures of a household. In addition, because this thesis
focuses on low-income families, the majority of whom are ren-
ters (e.g., in 1969, in the Boston SMSA, about 64 percent of
all households whose income was under $10,000 were renters),
the housing expenditures of renters are more relevant than
those of homeowners.
Regarding past studies on this subject, the most exten-
sive and intensive ones were done by G.CarlinerM.Reid, 7 NEkanem, 8
and I.. Lowry.9 These studies, as well as research by others,
have focused mainly on income elasticity. They are discussed
7Margaret G. Reid, Housing and Income, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1962.
8Nkanta F. Ekanem, The Demand for Housing: An Analysis
by Family Type, Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1972.
9Ira S. Lowry, Joseph S. DeSalvo, and Barbara M. Woodfill,
Rental Housing in New York City, Volume II, The Demand for
Shelter, New York City Rand Institute, New York City, New York,
1971.
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in the following sections.
II-C-1. Summary and analysis of studies by M. Reid
a. Data base, concepts, and method
The various data, concepts, and methods used by Margaret
Reid to study rent expenditure effects of income, price, fam-
ily size, age of head, sex of head, and race of head are sum-
marized and analyzed below.
b. Effects of income on rent expenditure
In a study done in 1962, Reid estimated income elastici-
ties of average housing expenditures with respect to average
housing income of tenants in several metropolitan areas. The
data base and concepts used, and the formula applied by Reid
are described in tables II-1 and 11-2. Although the estimates
of income elasticity she had obtained ranged from .860 to
1.226. Because of "heterogeneity of housing variables related
to rent control',O Reid judged that the result of renters were
far from normal, and', paying less attention to the result of
renters, stated that "the elasticity of housing with respect to
normal income appears to be between 1.5 and 2.0" .11 This is a
misleading conclusion in regard to renters, because she payed
minor attention to the result of renters and relied heavily on
results of homeowners to derive this conclusion. Since this
thes;is is focusing on renters, the result of renters will be
discussed- in this section* The Reid's result suggests
1M. Reid, Opacit., Housing and Income, p.194.
1 Ibid., p.6, p.376 .
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TABLE II-1
COEFFICIENTS OF REGRESSION BY M. REID
Regression Coefficient of Y
Metropolitan Area 1.16
Urban Area 0.95
Dependent Variable: average contract rent of a
group of households within
areas. The groups are de-
fined by housing quality.
Y: average income of a group as an indicator of
permanent income.
Formula: not specified , but supposed to be R=a b
Data:- 1950 Housing Census.
Source: based on M. Reid, op.cit., Housing and Income,
p. 162, p. 170.
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TABLE 11-2
RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION BY M.REID
One of the results of M. Reid's study is as follows:
Result b c d e f g R2
A .995 .470
B 1.002 .450 .478
C .860 .586 -.323 .520
D .877 .558 -.306 .558 .538
E 1.226 1.385 .578
F 1.024 .446 -.236 .229 1.274 .612
Based on M. Reid, Op.cit.., Housing and Income, pp. 149-151..
Data: 1950 Housing Census, United States, 30 Metro-
politan Areas
Formula: H =3-Yb'(Af)'(L) d(B 1 ) (B2 )(P r )
where
H = median contract rent as an indicator of median
rent of each metropolitan area
Y = median money income before taxes as an
indicator of permanent income
A f = 100 .All households, excluding those
headed by a male over 65 or all
headed by a female households
P = variable which indicates rent increase
r from 1941 to 1950
B1 , B2 = variables which indicate ages of the
housing stock
L = variable which indicates employment
opportunity
A,B,C,D,E,F = terms in stepwise regressinn.
Note: No indication of significance level of each
coefficient.
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that income elasticity is almost unity if we use "permanent
income" as a dependent variable; that is to say, that the
rent-income ratio is constant in terms of permanent income
(see Table II-1).
However, several problems exist in Reid's estimation
procedure. First, she used data from several metropolitan
areas but did not attempt to insert any price factor into her
estimating formula. Second, she grouped her data by housing
quality, using the census categories under "dilapidated."1 2
Several researchers already suggested that this grouping in-
troduces a bias in estimates. 1 3
Grouping by housing quality tends to classify households
by the level of housing services they receive. The result of
this method is that households with stronger preference for
housing than other goods are concentrated in the high quality
categories and these households, on the average, have high
incomes. Likewise, households with a weaker preference for
housing than for other goods are concentrated in low quality
categories. As a consequence, the estimated elasticities
have a bias toward high. Third, Reid grouped the data by met-
ropolitan area, and assumed median income to be an indica-
tor of permanent income. However, the median income of a
1 2 Housing categories were not specified beyond the use
of the category titles. This is another problem of Reid's
study.
1 3 F. DeLeeuw, Op. cit., "The Demand for Housing: A
Review of Cross-Section Evidence."
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whole metropolitan area can in no way be considered the per-
manent income of any group of households. Due to these prob-
lems, Reid's estimates of elasticity must be used with cau-
tion.
c. Effects of household characteristics on rent
expenditure
Age of head. Reid studied the effects of the age of the
head of households on the rent-income ratio, using cross-
tabulations. One of her results is illustrated in the Figure
11-3- 4 Her conclusion was, in regard both to renters and
owners. that "housing-income ratios tend to be high for house-
holds or consumer units with an aged head, moderately high for
those with a young head and relatively low for those with a
middle-aged head,"15 and that "income varies markedly with age
of head, while housing differs only slightly.",16
One problem associated with this method is that it is not
clear whether the movement of the rent-income ratio is a re-
sult of head's age difference or a result of the difference
in the median incomes of groups. Because Reid used aggregated
data, it is difficult to separate reliably the effects of
14M. Reid, Op. cit.,Housing and Income, p. 60. The
graphs of the Figure 11-3 are based on Table 3 on p. 60. The
data base is the 1950 United States Housing Census, using the
median rent and income of each age strata of all husband-wife
renters in all standard metropolitan areas.
151bid., p. 61.
16Ibid., p. 87.
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Rent-income ratio
20
15
10
I t - _ _ a a 2
15 25 35 45 55 65 Age of head
II-3-A
Mediam Gr
4,000
2,000
ass Income()
-
15 25 35 45 55 65 Age of head
11-3-1
Figure 11-3. Rent-Income Ratio by Age of Head
and Annual Income by Age of Head.
Source: Based on Table 3 on p.60
of M.Reid, op.cit.
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head's age from the effects of income. Income and other fac-
tors which are supposed to have effects on rent-income ratio
should be controlled for, in order to isolate the effects of
the age of head.
Size of household. Reid's conclusion is that net effect
of increase in number of persons per household is a decline
in housing-income ratio for both renters and owners. In
addition to the same type of cross-tabulation analysis as that
described in the section on the effect of head's age, Reid
used another source of data, which is illustrated in Table
II-38. In this case, income is relatively controlled for,
and therefore, Reid's conclusions are partly supported by the
data. However, there remains the problem that the renters
are not separated from the owners.
Sex and race of head. Female headed households showed a
high rent-income ratio as compared with the ratio of male-
headed households: 9 This ratio was especially high for house-
holds with an aged female head. Reid's explanation of this
result is that 1) single mothers have low incomes because of
child-care time; and 2) the average income of single women is
depressed by the probable incidence of negative transitory in-
come. One problem of this result is that, again, income was
M. Reid, Op. cit., Housing and Income, p. 88.
18Ibid., p. 72.
1 9 Ibid., p. 67. The data base used here is the Housing
Census, 1950.
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TABLE 11-3
MEAN HOUSING EXPENDITURE OF THE EIGHT INCOME
CATEGORIES UNDER $10,000
(Each category has a weight of one)
(Irrespective of tenure)
Number of persons Housing expenditure
in a household of owners and renters
One $484
Two $482
Three $462
Four $438
Five $413
Six or more $366
Source: The Consumption Survey of 1950.
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not controlled for and therefore, it is not clear whether the
high rent-income ratio is a function of income or of being
female.
Reid also found that the housing expenditures of whites
was much higher than that of non-whites when the current in-
come of households was held constant, and when housing ex-
penditure and current income of owners were compared. How-
ever, Reid disregarded this data. Basing her reasoning on
average income and average housing expenditure of three house-
hold groups classified by housing quality, Reid concluded
that little difference among two racial groups was likely to
exist in housing expenditure if the permanent income was held
constant.20 This conclusion is ill-reasoned because the aver-
age income and the average housing expenditure of household
groups classified by housing quality are poor measures of per-
manent income and biased estimates of housing expenditure,
as explained in section II-C-1-b.
In short, Reid gathered good data; however, she derived
less reliable conclusions in most cases, since she heavily re-
lied on the group average type permanent income concept. It
is difficult to cluster small enough groups to obtain good
estimates of permanent income.
M. Reid, Op. cit., Housing and Income, p. 190.
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3I-C-2. Summary and analysis of studies by N. Ekanem
Nkanta Ekanem studied variations in the proportion of
income spent on housing by household type and by metropolitan
areas, using data from the United States Census of 1960. He
concluded that there was little effect of any metropolitan
differences on housing expenditure-income proportions. How-
ever, Ekanem did find significant effects of household types
within a metropolitan area on those proportions. He also
found that income and price elasticities of demand for most
types of households tended to be unity, except for non-elderly
busband-wife homeowners. These conclusions are critically re-
-viewed below.
a. Data base, method, and concepts of Ekanem's study
Ekanem studied both owners and renters; however, only
renters will be discussed here. Ekanem conducted two re-
search studies, one about the effects of household character-
istics, and another about elasticities with respect to income
and price, each of which was based on different assumptions
from the other. The results of the two studies will be dis-
cussed in sections b and c, respectively.
In the first study, the rent-income ratio of each house-
hold's type was estimated by regression analysis separately
for each of 16 SMSA's in the United States. The assumption
underlying this first analysis was that income and price
elasticities are unity. The following regression formula
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was used:21
log (R/Y) = log + 'D+ A2D+ 13D 5 OD, (2.29)
0 11 2 ( +(.9
where
R = gross rent per year
Y = measured income or current income
D = elderly household: if a head is 65 years
or more, D = 1
D2 = single-person household: if single person,
D2 = 1; in all other cases, D2 = 0
D3 = Non-husband and wife household: if a house-
hold is non-husband and wife, D3 = 1; in all
other cases, D3= 0
D = female-headed household: if a head is female,
D = 1; in all other cases, D4 = 0
D = husband-wife household with head younger than5
45 years old, 1 or 0: if head is younger than
45 years old, D5 = 1; in all other cases,
D 5= 0
D5
21 In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, I have skipped
Ekanem's weighting procedure. The dependent.variables that
Ekanem used in his estimations was the logarithm of the rent-
income ratio weighted by the square root of the number of ren-
ter households. Because this is a transitory process of re-
gression computation, the principal formula is still equation
(2..29).For a detailed but confusing discussion about this,
see Ekanem, Op.cit.h, The Demand for Housing: An Analysis by
Family Type, pp. 8-10.
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O 02''''(5 = regression coefficients
This equation is a log-linear formula. The dummy variables
can be transformed into the following form:
log( R/Y) = log ++ . D 2 log DD + 5R logc/0 a2*log 2 +..+1 5*log5
(2.30)
where
D ,D ,D ,DD = e, if the household falls
into one of the categories
D1 through D5, as specified
in (2.29)
1, in all other cases.
Therefore, 1 1' 2
log(R/Y) log 0 .(D) .(D )(.....(D 5]
and consequently,
+1 ' 1 '( $2 'R = (Y). XOf0.(D) 1 .(D2 ) ..... (D5 ) 5' (2.31)
Equation (2.31) is exactly the same formula as (2.26) except
for the price factor contained in (2.26). Because Ekanem
analyzed each SMSA separately, the price factor could be as-
sumed to be constant. Thus, (2.31) is a pure log-linear for-
mula.
Two main problems associated with this regression model
are evident. First, he assumed income elasticity to be +1.0.
However, as Ekanem was aware,22 it is not certain whether-
2 2N. Ekanem, Ibid., p.5.
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income elasticity is, in fact, +1.0. For example, Reid's
conclusion was that the elasticity was between 1.5 and 2.0
and Lee's conclusion was that it was .65 for renters. 2 3
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that- the income elasticity
is not +1.0, and that therefore, the rent-income ratio that
Ekanem estimated could have been already biased by income ef-
fects, because he used group data instead of individual data.
Even if he had used individual data, disregarding the income
factor in the regression would have changed the significance
levels of the coefficients of the dummy variables.
Second, the factor of household size, except for single
persons, was not included in Ekanem's calculations. Since
household size is supposed to be a significant factor, Eka-
nem should have dealt with it in his study.
The data base Ekanem used for this analysis consisted
of classification tables from the 1960 Census, which show-
ed the estimated number of households in each SMSA. Since
Ekanem used group data, his dependent variable, i.e., rent-
income ratio, was an average which may introduce aggregation
problems causing bias.24
T.H. Lee, "Housing and Permanent Income: Tests Based
on a Three-Year Reinterview Survey," The Review of.Economics
and Statistics, L, 1968.
24See G. Carliner, "Income Elasticity of Housing Demand,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 1973.
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Ekanem also assumes that the choice of current income
rather than permanent income would not have an effect on
rent-income ratio, based on the argument that transitory
incomes will be dissolved into error term of regression equa-
tions. However, this assumption is not valid, as you see
in the argument in the II-A-1 section.
b. Results of the first study of Ekanem: Effects of
Household Characteristics on Rent-Income Ratio
Ekanem found that variables D (non-husband and wife3
households), and D5 (husband-wife household with head younger
than 45 years old) were not significant. The other factors;
i.e., elderly-headed households (D 1 ), single person house-
holds (D2 ), and female-headed households (D4 ) had significant-
ly positive effects on the rent-income ratios of all 16 SMSA's.
Specifically, the variable of female-headed households had
the highest positive effects on the rent-income ratio. Eka-
nem's results on the Boston SMSA revealed that standard house-
holds which had non-elderly male heads, and which were com-
prised of two or more persons were paying 18 percent of their
income for rent. On the other hand, households headed by an
elderly person paid 23 percent of their income, as did female-
headed households. Single person households paid 25.5 percent
of their income.
Ekanem also examined the effects of non-white character-
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iztics using the comparison between a weighted average rent-
income ratio and an actual rent-income ratio of non-white
buseholds. Ekanem's results suggested that non-white house-
bolds had higher rent income ratio than average households. 2 5
This result differs from Reid's finding of no differences be-
tween white households and non-white households. Ekanem tried
to explain his results but was unable to. This failure, again,
was caused by his disregard of income effects and by group
average data.
c. Ekanem's second study: income and price elasticities
In this study, Ekanem estimates inter-regional income
and price elasticities for renters. The estimated elastici-
ties are listed in Table 11-4. The estimates were based on
the following demand function:
B 1,-B2
H = .Y B -B2, (2.32)
where
Hi = housing demand of the ith type household
= preference coefficient or constant term
Y = permanent income of the ith type household
P = price of one unit of housing services in
a SMSA
B = income elasticity
B2 = price elasticity
2 5N. Ekanem, Op. cit., The Demand for Housing: an Analysis
by Family Type, p. 24.
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TABLE 11-4
INTER-METROPOLITAN AREAS INCOME AND PRICE
ELASTICITIES OF HOUSING DEMAND OF RENTERS
Type of household Income elasticity Price elasticity
Standard .93 -. 93
Elderly .92 -1.35
Single .97 -. 51
Female .87 -. 91
Based on N. Ekanem, The Demand for Housing: An Analysis
by Family Type, p. 29.
Standard'household = a nonelderly male-headed household
of two or more persons.
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In order to use current income, Ekanem transformed (2.32)
into :26
-B 2 +
iH1 = X 2,Yic -(1+U) (2-33)
where
U = a stochastic variable with zero mean
Yic = current income of the ith type household.
Thus, we can see that
H P 1-B B 1-l B
c ic (P) .(1+U) 1. 
(2.34)
Ekanem regressed the log-linear form of the equation (2.34)
using group data classified by four household types which were
shown in Table 11-4. For this regression, rent income ratios
expressed as R /Yic were estimated by household types, as in
the first study, for the 16 metropolitan areas.
The median incomes of the four types of households were
expressed as Yic' and the relative price of housing of each
5MSA was expressed as P.
The results of this regression are listed in Table 11-4.
Ekanem. concluded, based on these results, that income and
price elasticities were not terribly different from unity
among renter households.2 7
26Rationale and problems to do with this transformation
has been discussed in II-A-1.
27 N. Ekanem, Op.cit., The Demand for Housing, p. 25.
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This conclusion does not follow from the procedure of
his computation. What Ekanem analyzed was income and price
elasticities among geographical areas, not these elasticities
among households. Because he relied on the group data clas-
sified by household type regardless of income, and because
he regressed each household type separately using the 16 SMSA
data the outcomes were necessarily inter-regional income
elasticities, instead of elasticities among households. This
confusion about inter-regional and "among-households" income
elasticities stemmed from using group data and raises questions
about his conclusions.
II-C-3. Summary and analysis of studies by I. Lowry, J.
DeSalvo, and B. Woodfill
Ira S. Lowry and his colleagues tried to develop logi-
cal criteria for distinguishing those who need help with
their housing expenses from those who do not. As one part of
this effort, Lowry et al analyzed the rent-income ratios of
tenants in New York City, as well as the rental expenditure
patterns of various types of households. The effects of sub-
markets on rental expenditures were also studied by dividing
New York City into four submarkets and by running regression
analyses separately for those submarkets.
a. Data, method, and concepts used by Lowry et al
The distinguishing characteristics of Lowry's study on
rent-income ratios were: 1) that the individual data, rather
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than group data were regressed; 2) that the income effects
among households within a city, rather than cross-sectional
income effects were analyzed; and 3) a linear formula, rather
than a log-linear formula, was used as the regression equa-
tion.
However, Lowry and his colleagues used current income,
which tended to raise the rent-income ratio for households
with low current income and to lower this ratio for house-
holds with high current income.
The regression formula used was developed by trial and
error and has the following linear form:2 8
R /Y + v )
+ (O S+ rA S2+ -A+ 2 + O(eN+ C -F), (2.35)
where
R = gross rent per year of each household
Y = current income per year in $1,000
S = size of a household; i.e., the number of per-
sons in a household
A = age of a household head
N = dummy variable: race of head; if non-white
or Puerto Rican, then N = 1
F = dummy variable: sex of head; if female,
then F = 1
28
I. Lowry, Op.cit., Rental Housing in New York City,
pp. 228-229.
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l'''.**, '< 7 = Regression coefficients.
The underlying demand function, income elasticity func-
tion, and price elasticity function are as follows:
H = O(0+ ;Y+Y O,XS+ 2+ + -F- (2.36)
E = B, and
P2
EH _+ 2-s+ 3 -2 +.... F).Y ,( .7E= 3 7 '(2.37)Y LC+ (d 2+ v~y2+.. .. + F) Y
where
P = price of one unit of housing services
EE price elasticity of housing demand
E= income elasticity o f housing demand
H = annual gross rent
B = price elasticity
A distinctive characteristic of this demand function (2.36)
is the existence of an intercept d O 0 were delet-
ed from the function, the function would simply be a demand
function with unity income elasticity. By inserting 0 into
the function, Lowry allowed the income elasticity to be smal-
ler than 1.0. As discussed in section II-B, a linear type
demand function like Lowry's formula has no supporting theo-
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retical argument. Therefore, one must be careful about adopt-
ing a linear form such as this one.
b. Effects of income
Lowry's regression results on the effects of income are
summarized in Table 11-5. Lowry did not examine income elas-
ticities of housing demand but, instead, examined the effects
of income on rent expenditure. Contrary to Reid's and Ekanem's
conclusions, which were based on inter-regional analysis of
income elasticities, Lowry's conclusions were that, within any
of four sub-markets, income had the greatest effects on changes
in rent-income ratios. For example, except for Manhattan, in-
come of households explained 81 percent of the observed vari-
ance in the rent-income ratios.29 This means that, outside of
Manhattan, almost all of the explained variance (which is 81
percent, based on the -data of R2 in the Table 11-5) are attri-
buted to income for tenants in controlled housing, and that
81 percent out of 82 percent of the explained variance are at-
tributed to income for tenants in uncontrolled housing.
Income had negative effects on the rent-income ratio in
all four sub-markets; i.e., the rent-income ratio declined sig-
nificantly as income rose, although gross rent expenditures
increased as income rose. Thus, this finding contradicts
Reid's and Ekanem's conclusions that rent-income ratio is con-
stant over changes in household income. Using current instead
of permanent income might account for the decline.
29I. Lowry, Iid, p. 74.
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TABLE 11-5
RENT/INCOME RATIOS AS FUNCTIONS OF INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD
CHARACTERISTICS: FOUR HOUSING SUBMARKETS IN NEW YORK CITY,
1968
Controlled Housing Uncontrolled Housing
Man- Non-Man- Man- Non-Man-
Item hattan hattan hattan hattan
Regression
Parameters
Regression
constant .17784 .00917 .14014 .04555
1/(Income in
$1,000) .76638 .90718 1.22022 1.23049
Number of persons .01788 .01534 .05846 .01864
(Number of per-
sons) 2  - 001 42 -.00087 -.00636 -.00147
Age of household
head 
-.00536 -.00009a 
-.00486 
-.00147(Age of house-
hold head)2  .00004 .0 00 00a .00006 .00002
Sex of household
head:
Male .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000
Female .02923 .01004 .02899 .00078
Ethnic group of
household:
White non-
Puerto Rican .00000 .00000 .00000 .00000
Non-white or
Puerto Rican -. 03195 -. 00067a -
_
Regression
Statistics
Coefficient of de-
termination (R2 ) .66 .81 .56 .82
Standard error
of estimate (SE) .10 .08 .12 .08
Number of
observations 2,009 4,470 1,097 3,885
Source: Calculations by NYCRI from unit records of the New
York City Housing and Vacancy Survey of 1968.
a Not significantly different from zero at the .01 level of
significance. 23
2 3 Extracted from the Appendix C, Table C-7, I. Lowry,
Rental Housing in New York City, p. 237.
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c. Effects of other household characteristics
Race
In Lowry's study, the secondarily influential variable
was race, although it was far less influential than the income
variable. Lowry's study showed that, in all four sub-markets,
and at every level of income, housing expenditures of non-white
and Puerto Ricans were less than their white counterparts.
This finding is counter to what Ekanem.found; that is, that
non-whites were paying more for housing than whites were.
Female
Lowry concluded that, in all four sub-markets, female-
headed households spent more than male-headed households, re-
gardless of race.30 This is completely consistent with Reid's
and Ekanem's conclusions. However, Lowry's conclusion is an
overstatement of his results. He could have concluded that
females spent more than males, but he should not have concluded
that this was true for both ethnic groups. But the latter part
of this conclusion cannot be adequately addressed using his
regression model. Lowry's model does not allow one to separate
the effe'cts of white or non-Puerto Rican females from the ef-
fects of non-white or Puerto Rican females. Lowry was assum-
ing implicitly the same female effects for both ethnic groups.
In order to separate the effects of these two, the model should
have had an interactive term of sex and ethnicity. But, since
it did not, Lowry could not have based his conclusions about
301. Lowry, Ibid., p. 67.
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the ethnic difference of female effects on any empirical data.
Lowry's results on ethnicity and sex are illustrated in the
Figure II-4.31
Household size
The results of Lowry's analysis on household size are
illustrated in the Figure 11-5. 32 Lowry concluded that if
other factors were controlled, the housing expenses for each
added person to a household were modest; that peak expenses
were paid by households with four, five, or six persons, and
that large households spent less. These conclusions suggest
increasing housing expenses as household size increases from
one to four or five, as opposed to Reid's conclusion which
suggests decreasing housing expenses.
Age of head
Like the effects of household size, the effects of age
were not strong in Lowry's results, as is illustrated in the
Figure II-6.33 In a submarket which had no rent control, the
young and the old paid more than the rest of the population
if other characteristics were held constant. This is consis-
tent wit-h Reid's and Ekanem's conclusions and is more accurate
than those. Therefore, this conclusion seems to be quite
plausible.
31Composed from the four graphs in I. Lowry, Ibid.,
pp. 66-68.
3 2 Extracted from a graph in I. Lowry, Ibid., p. 70.
331n I. Lowry, Ibid., p. 72.
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II-C-4 Summary and conclusion
The studies by Reid, Ekanem, and Lowry et al are sum-
marized in Table 11-6.
a. Conclusions
Income effects
Because Reid's and Ekanem's studies were inter-regional
analyses that were based on group data, they do not adequately
derive the income elasticity of households. However, other
studies conclude that income elasticity of housing for renters
is less than 1.0.34
Therefore, a review of the literature suggests that in-
come elasticity of housing for renters is less than 1.0, using
current incomes. This means a rent-income .analysis should in-
clude an income variable among its independent variables.
However, two questions are still left for further study. These
questions are: How much is the income elasticity? And, is the
elasticity constant or variable?
Size
Reid's conclusion is consistent with our conventional
understanding that food, clothing, and some other goods are
34Please look at T.H. Lee, Op.cit., p. 486, G. Carliner,
"Income Elasticity of Housing Demand," the Review of Economics
and Statistics, February, 1973, and A. Solomon, Analysis of
Selective Census and Welfare Program Data to Determine Relation
of Household Characteristics, Housing Market Characteristics,
and Administrative Welfare Policies to a Dirtect Housing Assis-
tance Program, Joint Center for Urban Studies of the MIT and
Harvard University.
TABLE I1-6
RESEARCH CHARACTERISTICS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE THREE STUDIES
__________________Reid Ekanem Lowry
Research Characteristics: R
Data base Group average or Midpoint of group Individual,
group median. (a kind of group
average)
Control of income No, in most cases, No,in the first study. Yes.
Yes, in the seco .
Control of other factors Some yes, some not, Yes, es,
Methods Log-linear regres- Log-linear re- Linear regression.
sion. gression.
Cross-tabulation, Comparison with
row data.
Income assumptions No assumptions, Income elasticity Income elasticity
of housing is of housing is
1.0. less than 1.0
and more than
zero,
Income concept Permanent income, Permanent income. Current income.
Income effect analysis Inter-regional, Inter-regional. Intra-regional
(among households)
Conclusion:
Income elasticity (E ) E H. 5-2.0
(cross-sectional)
but data suggest:
E =. 860 v 1. 226
based on grouped
Y-.E 41i. 0
(cross-sectiona)
based on grouped
data. data.
E =0 N 1. 0
(cross-sectional,)
based on individual
data.
TABLE 11-6 (continued)
I I t
Conclusion:
Size vs. rent income
ratio (R/Y)O
Age vs. R/Y
Sex
Race
Size
(In one case, in-
come is control-
led; in another,
uncontrolled).
R/y
Age
(Income is un-
controlled),
Female -Whigh
(Income is un-
controlled),
No difference
between two,
I 1
Not analyzed
R/y
Age
(Income is un-
controlled),
Female ->high
(Uncontrolled),
Non-whiteg-r high,
R/ Y
Size
(Income is con-
trolled
R/ Y
Age
(Income is con-
trolled),
Female - high
(Controlled,
White- high,
V*1
00
Reid Ekanem Lowry
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more necessary than housing. On the other hand, because Lowry
had a fairly good data base, his conclusion, shown in Table
11-6, may be more reliable than Reid's. However, there is not
enough evidence to decide if either of these conclusions is
plausible. 35 Extra data pertinent to these questions from the
Boston analysis are presented in the next chapter.
Age
No significant conflict regarding the effects of age
exists among the three studies. This review suggests that
aged households tend to pay high rents; young households,
moderately high rents; and middle households, relatively low
rent. It also suggests that the conventional notion that aged-
headed households pay a severely high proportion of their in-
come for rent is somewhat exaggerated.
Sex
Regarding the effects of sex, there exists no conflict,
either. Reid, Ekanem, and Lowry et al agree that female-head-
ed households tend to pay higher rents.
Race
Each of the three studies came to different conclusions
regarding the effects of race. However, because of the reasons
35At the same time, there is another question. Food and
clothing are necessary goods. However, if a household's income
is very high, then food and clothing expenditure will no longer
be a budget constraint on housing expenditure. In this case,
it would be reasonable to expect that rent increases as size
of household increases for high-income households.
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explained in the respective sections, the conclusions of Reid
and Ekanem are less reliable than those of Lowry et al. There-
fore, it is reasonable to conclude that households headed by
whites tend to pay higher rents. However, further studies are
necessary.
Model specification
One major question remains. That is, does the demand
function have a linear form or a log-linear form?
The hypotheses and questions stated in this section will
be tested in the following section, using new data obtained
from the 1970 U.S. Census.
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BOSTON SMSA: QUALITATIVE
ANALYSIS BY CROSS-TABULATION
III-A. Introduction
III-A-l. Objectives and questions
a. Objectives
In this section, rent-income ratios of each household
type are re-examined, using new group average data derived
from individual data of Boston SMSA in 1970. This addi-
tional analysis of rent-income ratios is necessary because
there were wide variations among the conclusions of Reid,
Ekanme and Lowry et aL, as described in the section II-B-4
of this thesis. Therefore, in those cases in which the most
likely conclusions have been identified, it will be helpful
to test them using new data. Similarly, for cases where
the conclusions are uncertain, we need further analyses to
establish a concrete housing consumption pattern. Second,
since there is a debate over the model specification, we
shall begin an analysis by studying cross-tabulation of
rent-income ratios (or rent) and other household character-
istics. Doing this will help in identifying the nature of
the association among the variables and the type of speci-
fication to be tested. After this qualitative analysis of
relations between independent variables and a dependent
variable, we can then proceed to quantitative analyses,
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using regressions. Thirdly, further exploration of the
relationship between variables is necessary in order to
specify a better model. Finally, because it has a big in-
fluence, it is necessary to see whether there is an inter-
cept term--or a constant term-- in the relation between
the independent variable of income and the dependent vari-
able of gross rent. In summary, the objectives of this
further analysis are: to test existing empirical theories
based on new individual data from the 1970 U.S. Census,
and to specify a more accurate model by cross-tabulations.
b. Specific questions
Specific questions to be addressed in this analysis
are:
1) In regard to income, whether the linear demand
function used by Lowry is consistent with the
Boston data. In particular, is there an inter-
cept term or not?
2) Holding other factors constant, is the relation
between rent and income linear, exponential, or
logarithmic?
3) Holding other factors constant, what is the likely
relation between size of household and rent-in-
come ratio?
4) Are there interactive effects among the race and
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sex variables?
5) For continuous independent variables, are there
any unique changes in their movement such as a
peak or an inflection point?
6) In regard to age and sex, are the conclusions in
II-C-4 consistent with the Boston data?
III-A-2. Data, concept of income, and methods of the
analysis
a. Data
The data used in this study are from the Public Use
Sample, one out of a hundred, County Group and SMSA tapes
of the U.S. Housing Census in 1970.1 All renters in the
Boston SMSA were extracted from the Public Use Sample.
Those renters with no incomes or minus incomes and those
with no cash rent were deleted from the sample.2 Because
this study is focusing on how much tenants are paying or
how much they are willing to pay, such renters as the above
will cause biases in estimates if they are included in the
sample. Number of cases; that is, all renters in the Boston
1Please look at, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public
Use Samples of Basic Records from the 1970 Census: Des-
cription and Technical Documentation, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1972. For general reference,
look at U.S. Bureau of Census, 1970 Census Users' Guide:
Part 1, U.S. Department of Commerce.
2Number of cases of no-income renters was about 70.
Number of cases deleted by the other reasons could not be
identified because Public Use Sample does not specify those.
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SMSA, excluding those who are deleted by the procedure
above, classified by income and household size are listed
in Table III-1. We have 4,834 cases, in total. Multiply-
ing 4,834 by 100 leads to the actual number of total renter
households in Boston SMSA, excluding those who are deleted
by the procedure above. From 4,834, households with rent-
income ratios equal to or more than 100 percent were de-
leted in the analysis. Number of households with rent-
income ratio equal to .or more than 100 percent and less
than 1,000 percent were 286.. Among 286, 146 were house-
holds with income ranging from $1 to $999, 125 were those
with income from $1,000 to $1,999, 14 were those with.
income from $2,000 to $2,999, and 1 was a households with
income from $3,000 to $3,999. Therefore, the rent-income
ratio over 100 percent is a phenomenon among low-income
households especially those whose income were below $2,000.
Possible causes of this high incidence of the extremely
high rent-income ratio among low-income households are:
1) a possible tendency of low-income households to under-
state their income, and 2) having used current income
instead of permanent income. This high incidence suggests
TABLE III-1
NUMBER OF RENTER HOUSEHOLDS IN THE 1/100 SAMPLE OF BOSTON SMSA BY INCOME AND BY
HOUSEHOLD SIZE
Household
Size Income ($)
1.0-991 lk-1999 2k2999 3k-3999 4k4999 5k-5999 6k6999 7 k-7999 8k8999- 9k9999 10Ai0999
1 person 112. 253. 199. 155. 124. 139. 109. 86. 78. 42. 33.
2 persons 32. 72. 107. 104. 122. 115. 98. 125. 111. 106. 86,.
3 persons 17. 18. 47. 36. 42. 49. 59. 81. 56. 66. 56.
4 persons 14. 19. 18. 24. 24. 28. 43. 40. 49. 36. 43.
5 persons 5. 5. 4. 17. 18. 17. 14. 26. 25. 27. 24.
6 persons 5. 1. 2. 9. 14. 19. 11. 14. 15. 7. 13.
7 persons 3. 1. 3. 2. 6. 5. 6. 9. 9. 7. 5.
8 or more 2. 1. 1. 3. 3. 3. 0. 2. 7. 10. 2.
Total 190. 370. 381. 350. 353. 375. 340. 383. 350. 301. 262.
11k11999 12k-12999 13k43999 14k-14999 15k-15999 16k46999 17k17999 18k18999 19k19999 20K Total
1 21. 29. 11. 9. 11. 4. 2. 2. 2. 21. 1442.
2 78. 75. 54. 42. 33. 30. 19. 11. 24. 50. 1494.
3 43. 45. 29. 34. 17. 18. 11. 15. 7. 44. 790.
4 39. 32. 29. 14. 21. 11. 8. 7. 5. 25. 529.
5 10. 15. 15. 5. 10. 4. 9. 2. 4. 24. 280.
6 12. 3. 4. 8. 1. 7. 1. 4. 1. 9. 160.
7 10. 4. 3. 3. 3. 1. 0. 2. 0. 7. 89.
8+ 2. 4. 2. 1. 1. 0. 1. 0. 1. 4, 50.
T. 215. 207. 147. 116. 75. 51. 43. 44. 184.
Source: Table developed from 1/100 Public Use Sample of 1970 U.S. Housing Census
using EFFECT program.
4834. $
0&
97.
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that rent and income data of households with income below
$2,000 are less reliable to analize.
In the following analysis, the dependent variable
will be either rent-income ratio or annual rent itself.
To avoid heteroscedasticity, rent-income ratios rather than
annual rents were- analyzed as a major dependent variable,
while annual rents were analysed as a supplemental variable
when it was necessary to see rents as well as rent-income
ratios. The explaining variables will be annual income,
household size, age of head (so far, variables are con-
tinuous variables), race of head, and sex of head (latter
two are dummy variables). A summary of definitions of
all the variables is contained in Table 111-2. "Income"
is annual, gross and current income inclu'ding all kinds
of transfer payments. Rent is annual gross rent.
b. Concept of income
In this study, current income, rather than permanent
income, is used for the following reasons:
1) Data problem: It is generally accepted among
researchers that housing expenditures are spent by house-
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TABLE 111-2
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Sample Renters or -All renters in the Boston SMSA,
tenants or excluding "No cash rent renters",
households inhabitants of group quarters,
and those renters with no income
or with minus income.
Dependent
variables
Explaining
variables
Y
Rent or
annual rent
Definition
-Annual gross rent = monthly gross
rent x 12, which is equivalent to
(contract rent + average monthly
cost of utilities)x12.
-No cash rent renters have been
excluded.
Rent income -R/y or (Ri/Yj) (not Y )
ratio INt,
(N = total number of entries)
-Households with rent-income ratio
over 100% have been excluded.
Annual
income
-Annual, gross, and current income,
excluding no income or minus in-
come, "in kind" income and sale of
property income.
-However, net self-employment income,
and income from social security,
welfare, investments, pensions, and
unemployment insurance are included.
S Household 
-Number of persons in housing unit.
size 
-Excluding group quarter.
A Age of head -Age of head
-Excluding under 14 years of age.
N Non-white 
-Race of head.
(or race) -All races except white.
F Female
(or sex)
-Sex of head
-Female
i i
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holds based on their long-run income expectation rather than
on current income which may include transitory plus or minus
components. However, one problem associated with permanent
income is the difficulty of measurement, since permanent in-
come is defined as a long-run expected income. Thus, to
measure permanent income, we must have time series income
data for several years. Such data is really difficult to
gather. The best available data at this moment is the Public
Use Sample, one out of a hundred, of the 1970 U.S. Census,
which does not show time series data. Therefore, this study
has to rely on the current income. However, at the end of
this section a possibility of modifying estimates of income
elasticity that is based on current income into estimates
based on permanent income will be discussed.
2) Problem of group data
To get estimates of permanent income without studying
time series data, group average or group median methods have
been used by many researchers. For example, Ekanem, Reid,
and others attempted to reduce the bias of current income
by using group medians. They argue that the transitory com-
ponents of current income are dissolved into an error term,
leaving permanent income. Nevertheless, biases can still
4 For example, Muth, "The Demand for Non-Farm Housing",
The Demand for Durable Goods, Harberger (ed), University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960.
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arise and another problem also develops. Generally, groups
are so large that much of the variation in permanent income
among households is also lost. Therefore, it is more accur-
ate to use individual data of current income than to use
group average data of current income. This is especially
true in cases such as this study in which income is expected
to explain a large portion of the deviations in housing ex-
penditures among various household groups. In this study,
average of individual rent-income ratios in a group strati-
fied by income was used to construct cross-tabulations.
c. Modification of income elasticity
In this study, current income is used. In order to
estimate income elasticity with respect to permanent income,
the income elasticity with respect to current income should
be adjusted in some way, because using current income in-
stead of permanent income results in underestimating the in-
come elasticities of housing demand. G. Carliner 5 studied
the differences among income elasticities derived from dif-
ferent income definitions. Based on four-year individual
data, Carliner concluded that income elasticity with respect
to permanent income for renters is 0.5. A summary of Car-
liner's results are listed in the Table 111-3. This table
shows how much estimates of income elasticity with respect
5 G. Carliner, "Income Elasticity of Housing Demand,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 1973.
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TABLE 111-3
INCOME ELASTICITY OF HOUSING DEMAND
Regressions with
Demographic Terms Regressions Without
Income
Definition Owners Renters Owners Renters
Y .631 (.023) .520 (.023) .580 (.019) .483 (021)
Yd- .619 (.023) .521 (.023) .564 (.019) .480 (.020)
.499 (.021) .439 (.020) .472 (.018) .410 (.018)
Y .746 (.023) - .676 (.019) -
Source: G. Carliner, "Income Elasticity
p. 530.
of Housing Demand,"
Y = permanent income which is the simple four-year
average of measured household income
Y = permanent income which is the weighted four-year
average. Income for the current year has a weight
of 0.4; for the previous year, 0.3; for the year
before that, 0.2; and for the first year, 0.1
Y =current year's measured income
Y =permanent income including imputed rent (income
concept for homeowners).
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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to current income differ from the one with respect to perma-
nent income. Specifically, an estimate of income elasticity
based on permanent income is about 117 to 118 percent of an
estimate of income elasticity based on current income, ac-
cording to Carliner. This gives us some sense about how much
estimates of elasticity based on current income should be ad-
justed in order to give estimates of elasticity based on per-
manent income. As a consequence, it suggests rent-income
ratios based on permanent income also should be increased by
the same rate as the rate used to adjust the elasticity;
that is, by 117 or 118 percent.
d. Target geographical area
In this study, the Boston SMSA is analyzed as a whole
instead of being subdivided into several submarkets. The
reasons for this are the following:
1) Focus on the effects of household characteristics
Although most other researchers have assumed that hous-
ing price is constant within an SMSA, Lowry et al suggested
that housing prices differ between a central business dis-
trict (CBD) (Manhattan, in his research) and the suburbs
within a city. Lowry's argument is reasonable with respect
to the price factor. However, the main intention of this
study is to see the effects of household characteristics,
including income, on rental expenditures (namely quantities
multiplied by price s). In this study, I assumed the price
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elasticity of housing demand in Boston SMSA is 1.0. Then the
rents paid by households with the same incomes but located at
different parts of the SMSA are the same. As a consequence,
the same rent-income ratio is maintained for all households in
the SMSA. This will delete the effects of price changes in
the SMSA, and allow us to look at effects of household charac-
teristics on rents for the whole SMSA.
2) Data problem
Even if this study were intended to analyze the effects
of prices in submarkets, one should not underestimate the
difficulties of measuring the prices, gathering data, and de-
fining the CBD. And also, the Public Use Sample does not
allow us to divide the data according to location in the CBD
or in the suburbs.
3) CBD of Boston is not so strong
The central business district of Boston is not as dis-
tinctive as Manhattan. It is reasonable to assume that there
are less differences between housing prices in the Boston CBD
and in the Boston suburbs than are found in New York City.
e. Gross income
In this study, gross income is used instead of dispos-
able income. Because there is no good way to estimate dis-
posable income, and because estimating disposable income in-
volves value judgment on what are the inevitable expendi-
tures, estimates of disposable income become contingent to
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policy factors. Once rent, income, and size association are exam-
ined, it may be possible to develop a notion of disposable in-
come.
f. Method
In this study, controlled cross-tabulation was used. Speci-
fically, taking the rent-income ratio and rent itself as depend-
ent variables, various cross tables by either of two dependent
variables and by one of explaining variables (such as income or
household size) are constructed. For each cross-tabulation, the
other variables were controlled to be constant to the extent
possible.
The EFFECT program at MIT was used for computation and
tabulation. Developing graphs of rent-income ratios versus, for
example, income from these tables facilitates development of mod-
el specification for later use for regression analysis. For ex-
ample, they help in determining by which line among linear and
non-linear lines a good fit can be expected, and also in what
range a linear line (or non-linear line) fits to data and in what
ranges it does not fit. One problem of these graphs is that the
curves will have wide fluctuations due to error terms or "noises"
and consistent judgments about errors arising from sample fluctu-
ations are difficult to obtain.
III-B. Results of Cross-Tabulation
III-B-1. Effects of Income
The results of the cross-tabulations of rent-income
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ratios by incomes and of rent by income are illustrated in
Figures III-1-A, B and III-2-A, B. Plots in the graphs are
average rent-income ratios (that is, 1 ) for incomeN. i Yi
groups with N 0, where N is a member of cases in each group.
The graphs show that, when household characteristics are
held constant, rent-income ratios dramatically increase as
income decreases.
a. Role of income in consumption behavior
The first thing suggested by the results is not sur-
prising; that is, an income variable plays a significant
role in rent-income ratios and should be included in any
model for estimating rent-income ratios. In other words,
rent-income estimates that disregard the income factor are
less reliable. For instance, Ekanem's rent-income estimates
of elderly families or female families are overestimations of
the effects of those characteristics because it ignores the
effects of high incidence of low-income among those families.
b. Income elasticity of housing demand assuming
constant prices
Both rapid decrease in rent-income ratios along with
increase in incomes and stable rent-income ratios around
10 percent for high-income households suggest that income
elasticities of housing demand is somewhat high for high-
income households and close to zero for the lowest income
households, and that income elasticity is below 1.0 for all
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income households. This implies that income elasticities
could be variable rather than constant. It also suggests,
in opposition to Reid's conclusions, that for low-incomes
housing is really one of the necessity goods.
c. Intercept and regression formula
The question discussed in this section is "What is the
best regression formula in regard to income, or more speci-
fically, which is more plausible a simple linear formula
or a log-linear one?" The curves shown in the Figure III-
i-A and -B suggest that -an-inverse of income (that is, 1/Y)
is appropriate as an explaining variable of regressions.
Namely,
R/= a + b . (3.1)
or
R/= = a. (3.2)
where b>O, b'>O ,
are the possible formulae.
Multiplying them by Y leads to the following housing expendi-
ture formulae:
R = b + a.Y (3.3)
or
R = a'.(y) 1-b( 3 .)
The differences between these two formulae are the intercept
term b and the expornent of Y: that is, the choice of an
appropriate formula depends on whether there is intercept
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b or not, and whether or not b'=l. The figure
III-2-A and -B suggest intercept b exists. Those curves do
not seem to extend down to zero rent. On the contrary, they
suggest that households tend to maintain a certain level of
rent expenditure, even at the lowest income. As a conse-
quence, it can be said that the formula (3.3) is supported
more strongly by the data as a rent regression formula than
is the (3.4).
The figure III-2-A and -B show graphs of rents versus
incomes stratified by household sizes. Those graphs show a
wide range of fluctuations and it is hard to tell whether
the graphs are linear or non-linear. Therefore, we are not
sure whether the formula (3.3) is appropriate or not. In
this case, it is better to use a more general formula than
(3.3); that is,
R = b + a.Yc (3.5)
As a conclusion, the best formula for regression is (3.5)
and regressions should be run separately for different house-
hold sizes.
'One problem here is that the formula (3.5) cannot be
regressed using linear
regression. Formulae we can run are, again, (3.1) or (3.2).
Therefore, it should be re-examined whether the constant
term b is important or the exponential form Yc excluding
b is important in regression. There are two evidences which
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are not definitive but suggestive to this re-examination. One
is the Figure 111-8. One graph in the figure shows the relation
of rents to incomes based on uncontrolled data; that is, based
on all renters in Boston SMSA instead of the white, male-headed
non-aged renters. It shows a clear straight line and suggests
the index c of the equation (3.5) is 1.0.
Another is trial runs of single regressions using both
formulae (3.1) and (3.2) Taking the data of two-person house-
holds illustrated in the Figure III-2-A, the two formulae were
regressed. Results showed that coefficients of the determinant
(R2 ) of (3.1) and (3.2) were .99 and .97, respectively. The high
R2 were obtained partly because the regression were run using
the average of rents of households grouped by income class. This
result suggests that, again, both R2 are close to each other and
difficult to separate, but also it suggests that (3-1) could be
a better formula than (3.2), if one uses current income instead
of permanent income.
The overall conclusion about regression formulae is that
the best formula is (3.5), and that (3.1) could be a better
formula than (3.2). To confirm this conclusion, however, further
regression analyses are necessary.
d. Income and household size
Look at Figure III-1-A and B. The figures suggest that,
as a whole, household size has very little effect on rent-
income ratios. However, upon closer inspection, it is evident
that household size becomes fairly influential as
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incomes decrease. For example, one-person households with
incomes of $3,000 to $4,000 paid about 35 percent of their
income for rent, while 3-to 4-person households with the
same income paid as much as 50 percent. This conclusion will
be supported by the later section which will discuss the ef-
fects of household size.
The effects of household size are not simple. For
households of up to 3-4 persons, household size has a posi-
tive effect on rent income ratios, but for households larger
than 3-4 persons, there seem to be negative effects.
e. Elasticity and household size
Look at the Figure III-2-A and -B again. It is clear
that rent expenditures are inelastic in terms of income for
large size households, while they are comparatively elastic
for small-size households.
f. Rent-income ratio of low-income households
It is surprising to see how much of their incomes low-
income households are paying for housing. They are paying
for rents by really high ratios. For example, households
with annual incomes of $3,000 are paying 50 percent of their
income for rent, regardless of household size. Does such
a figure represent actual payment? There are two possible
kinds of noises in these data: that is, welfare payments
and mis-reporting of income. If there were any kind of
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housing earmarking in welfare payments, it would increase
rent expenditures of welfare recipients. Massachusetts has
basically two welfare programs for low-income households:
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the Gen-
eral Relief. Both programs have no housing earmarking.6
As a consequence, welfare programs do not necessarily inflate
rental expenditure. How about mis-reporting of income among
low-income families? It is quite possible that low-income
families tend to understate their incomes. One piece of evi-
dence for this is that, among renter households headed by
white male 18-64 years of age and with incomes under $2,000,
69 out of 89 cases reported rental payments higher than their
incomes, based on the 1970 U.S. Census Public Use Sample.
Low-income families could have a tendency to not report in-
comes from part-time jobs. Although income understatement
is quite possible among low-incomes, it is also confirmed by
several housing officials based on their empirical knowledge
that rent payments could easily be as high as 50 to 60 per-
cent of their incomes for low-income families.
6Based on an interview with M. Ringer, Housing Unit
Section, State Welfare Department.
7Based on an interview with M. Hobbs, Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency.
8Based on an interview with M. Ringer, Mr. Crowley
of Boston Housing Authority, etc.
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III-B-2. Effects of race and sex
a. Results
The results of the cross-tabulations with respect to
effects of race and sex of household heads on rent-income
ratios is illustrated in Figures 111-3 and -4 ,from which house-
holds with rent-income ratio over 100% were already excluded.In this
study, race and sex are considered dichotomous variables:
race of a head of a household is defined as either white or
non-white, and its sex is defined as either male or female.
In order to see interactive effects of race and sex, as well
as effects of race or sex, four cross-tables are constructed
for households headed by white females, white males non-white
females and non-white males.
When household size and age of head are held roughly
constant, as a whole, race and sex have a little effect on
rent-income ratios. For middle-and high-income households
whose incomes are over $8,000, both race and sex seem to
have no effect on the rent-income ratio; however, for house-
holds whose incomes are under $8,000, these variables do
have effects.
Among low-and moderate-income households, those who
are headed by whites tend to pay higher rents than those
headed by non-whites. However, one new finding of this study
is that the difference in rent-income ratios occurs only be-
tween white female-headed households and non-white female-
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headed households. For male-headed households, the race of
the head of household has no effect, although a slight dif-
ference between white males and non-white males can be seen
in Figure IV-4. If this finding is correct, it suggests that
racial differences in rent-income ratio are evident only for
females.
Among low-and moderate-income households, white female
heads have higher rent-income ratios. This finding agrees
with the conclusion cited in Section II-C-4. On the con-
trary, non-white female heads have lower rent-income ratios.
This is a new finding and unexpected, according to the re-
sults reported in the literature reviewed in the previous
chapter. Thus, this finding requires further examination.
b. Effects of public housing
Possible effects of public housing were examined in
reference to the lower rent-income ratios of non-white
women. We know that public housing accommodates many house-
holds headed by non-white females. The tenants are supposed
to pay 25 percent of their incomes on rent. 9 Therefore,
public housing has a negative effect on the rent-income ratio
of non-white female-headed households who were previously
9To state the situation more exactly, tenants in pub-
lic housing are required to pay 25 percent of their adjusted
incomes. In this study, however, computation was done as-
suming that 25 percent of gross income was required, mainly
for convenience.
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paying more than 25 percent of their income for rent on the
average. It could be a cause of.low rent-income ratios of
non-white females. To see whether the low rent-income ratio
of non-white females was caused by public housing, two data
sets (set A and set B; to know what they are, look at Tables
III-4-A and -B) which showed significantly low rent-income
ratios of non-white females in the Figure 111-3 were adjusted
in order to exclude the effects of public housing.
Adjustment was based on two assumptions. First, the
City of Boston was assumed to be able to fairly represent
the whole Boston SMSA in terms of the households' numbers
in the public housing against the total renter households,
so as to allow this study to use Boston data in order to ad-
just rent-income ratios. Secondly, the number of households
in public housing (both federal and state) in 1969 was the
same as those in 1970, so as to allow this study to use the
data in 1970. Based on the data of the Boston Housing Author-
ity, 1 a probability of a renter to be living in the public
housing instead of a private rental unit was calculated for
each of four groups: white female, white male, non-white
female, and non-white male-headed households. Then rent-
income ratios of Boston city (ratios which are identical to
1 0The Table, Head of Household by Race (in 1970 in the
City of Boston), constructed by Mr. Saffadini, Boston Housing
Authority.
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those of Boston SMSA) were adjusted by the formula of
R 1R-(P) P(P) (3.6)
P(T)
where
p(P) = probability of a household in a gmup to be living
in public housing
R= measured rent-income ratio of a group (not
adjusted)
IR(P) = rent-income ratio of households in public
housing; that is .25
p(P) = probability of a household in a group to
be not living in. public housing, that is,
1.0 - p(P)
E = rent-income ratio of households in a group
and not in public housing; that is, an
adjusted rent-income ratio.
Results are illustrated in Table III-4-A and -B. The
precise procedure of computation is explained in Appendix
A. The adjusted rent-income ratios of data set B show that
the rent-income ratio of non-white female-headed households
is close to that of the white females; that is, the non-
white females no longer show lower rent-income ratios. How-
ever, the non-white females in data set A still show lower
rent-income ratios. Therefore, although it is hard to con-
clude, based on only one set of data, that having a non-white
female head has negative effects on the rent-income ratio,
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TABLE III-4-A
RENT-INCOME RATIOS OF
HOUSEHOLDS WITH INCOME $4,000-$6,000 (DATA SET A)
(3-6 person households with a head 18-64 years of age)
Original Rent-Income Adjusted Rent-Income
Ratios *1 Ratios *2
white- non-white white non-white
headed headed headed headed
Male headed .320 .310 .325 .321
Female headed .350 .260 .359 .266
*1 Extracted from the Figure 111-3.
*2 See Appendix A.
TABLE III-4-B
RENT-INCOME RATIOS OF
HOUSEHOLDS WITH INCOME $2,000-$4,000 (DATA SET B)
(3-6 person households with a head 18-64 years of age)
Original Rent-Income Adjusted Rent-Income
Ratios *1 Ratios *2
white- non-white white non-white
headed headed headed headed
Male headed .530 N.A. .548 N.A.
Female headed .500 .420 .522 .516
N.A. = invalid data because of a too small entry.
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it is plausible to conclude that having a non-white female
head has no positive effects on rent-income ratios.
III-B-3. Effects of household size
The results of this study are illustrated in Figure
111-5. Among households headed by white males 18-64 years
of age, household size has no effect on the rent-income
ratios for households whose incomes are over $6,000. This
means that households with the same income pay their rent
by the same ratio regardless of their size, provided their
income is over $6,000. As income decreases below $6,000,
household size becomes influential in a special way: name-
ly, households of 2-4 persons have high rent-income ratios,
while households with one person or 5-or-more persons pay
comparatively less rent than those with 2-4 persons. This
result is consistent with the result of Lowry's study in
regard to low-income households, but in regard to middle-
and high-incomes, the results of this study are not consis-
tent with his results. The curve of rent income ratios for
middle-and high-income households can easily be explained.
First, as the size of a household increases, space needs
increase; however, at the same time, needs for food, cloth-
ing, etc. increase. As a consequence, expenditure prefer-
11 See M. Reid, Op. cit., p. 88, and I. Lowry,
Op. cit., p. 71.
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ences for housing or other goods remain the same. Second,
more space could be obtained for a larger household without
extra expenditure by choosing housing in a different neigh-
borhood. The curve of rent-income ratios for low-incomes
could reflect two things. At the beginning, an additional
person to a household requires more housing than other
goods, but after household sizes have reached to 3-4 per-
sons, need for other goods by an additional person to a
household becomes overwhelming.
III-B-4. Effects of age of head
The results of this study on the effects of the age
of head are illustrated in Figure 111-6. For households
with incomes higher than $10,000, the age of heads has no
effect on rent-income ratios for two-person households, and
have slightly negative effects on the ratios for 1 and 3-4
person households. An exception to this is the curve for
the 3-4 person household with incomes from $15,000 to
$20,000, the curve which shows strong negative effects
of age on rent-income ratios. This is a different finding
from that of Lowry. For households with incomes below
$10,000, however, the age of heads has clear effects: age
has a negative effect on rent-income ratios until the age
of 60 years. Thereafter, the age of head has a positive
effect on the ratio. As a consequence, for households are
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controlled to be headed by white males and to have incomes
below $10,000, rents are paid by the lowest ratios by house-
holds with heads 60 years old; by the highest ratios by
young households, and by the intermediate ratios by aged
households. This finding is basically consistent with the
findings cited in II-C-4, although it deviates in one as-
pect: i.e., this study suggests that aged households are
paying rent by the moderate ratios instead of by the highest
ratios, as compared with young and middle-aged households.
One of the possible reasons that young households
were found to be paying rent by the highest ratios may be
caused by the high permanent income of young households.
It is reasonable to assume that young households have higher
expected future incomes; that is, permanent incomes, than
the older households. Thus, this high permanent income may
cause high housing expenditures.
III-C. Cross-Table Analysis of Uncontrolled Data
Thus far, in this study on the Boston SMSA, the data
analyzed were renter households headed by white males of 18
to 64 years of age, for all the studies except the study for
the race-sex analysis and the age analysis. In this section,
analyses were done based on uncontrolled datal2 stratified
12 "Uncontrolled data" means the data which consists
of all renter households in Boston SMSA instead of those
headed by white males of 18 to 64 years of age, that were
referred to as "controlled".
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by income and size, in order to examine whether or not the
conclusions based on the controlled data are generalizable
to other types of households. And also, this section in-
tends to see general effects of income and household size.
Since these two are major policy factors in housing assis-
tance programs, and since the results of the uncontrolled
data will be a convenient material for quick references to
see how much rent tenants with certain income and household
size are paying on the average in the Boston SMSA.
Results of this section suggest that the earlier find-
ings are generalizable in terms of effects of incomes and
household sizes. Because incomes and household sizes of
uncontrolled households showed the same effects on rent-
income ratios as those of controlled households did. It
means that, even after aggregating the deviations of rent-
income ratios from averages by races, sexes, and ages of
heads, household sizes and incomes maintained the same ef-
fects on rent-income ratios. As we have seen in previous
sections, there are deviations by races, sexes, and ages of
heads, but those deviations are small component to the income
effect.
III-C-1. Effects of income
In Section III-B-1, households headed by white males
of 18-64 years of age were studied. (see Figures III-1-A
and -B). In this section, all renter households in the
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SMSA are examined. The results are illustrated in figures
III-7-A and -Bgwhich show exactly the same pattern as in
figures III-1-A and -B. The graphs show clear hyperbolic
shapes rather than straight declining lines. The devia-
tions by household sizes are reduced from the deviations
in figures III-1-A and -B.
Integrating household size categories leads to the
overall average rent-income ratios by income, which are
illustrated in Figure III-8.13 This figure also shows
average rent expenditures by income. Those two curves in
Figure 111-8 are surprisingly simple and strongly support
that a linear demand equation such as (3.3) will fit the
data better than the log-linear form given in (3.4). These
results are consistent with the conclusions expressed in
Section III-B-1 based on the controlled data. The rela-
tionship between annual rent and income suggested by Fig-
ure 111-8 is:1 4
R = 1.25 + (.047).Y, (3.5)
13Two curves of rent-income ratios and rents in Figure
111-8 were constructed from the identical data but by dif-
ferent computation procedures. Therefore, two comparable
data points on each curve do not exactly fit each other.
14Based on the results of regressions summarized in
Table 111-5. The last row of the table for "all households"
shows the regression coefficients of Figure 111-8.
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where
R = annual rent in units of $1,000 and
Y = annual income in units of $1,000 ,
a. Rent-income ratio and elasticity
For purposes of convenience, the six rent-income curves
in Figure III-7-A, -B, and Figure 111-8 were regressed
based on the following bivariate regression formula
using group average data shown in Table IV-2,
R Y = + B(y). (3.6)
The results of this regression are summarized in Table III-
5. A coefficient of determinant (that is R 2) in Table III-
5 indicates how well an equation fits to data. For example,
R 2 = .9684 indicates that 96.84 percent of the variation of
rent-income ratios are explained by the inverse of income.
The R2 in the table are very high, because aggregated data
(which is shown in Table IV-2) was used, where all individual
households within the same income class are grouped together.
If individual data were used, R2 would be much lower than
those in the Table.
If the formula (3.6) is transformed into a rent re-
gression formula like (3.5) B in Table 111-5 indicates
the intercept and C indicates the slope. As one can see in
this table, 1-person households and 6-7-person households
have low intercepts (B) and high slopes (GA), while 2-5-
person households have high intercepts and low slopes. Al-
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TABLE 111-5
RENT-INCOME RATIO REGRESSION RESULTS (COEFFICIENTS OF
REGRESSION).
Household Type Regression Coefficients Coefficient of
Determinant
B R2
1 person household .0587 1.1407 .9684
2 person household .0470 1.3136 .9991
3,person household .0331 1.3955 .9986
4-5 person hsehold .0343 1.3227 .9972
6-7 person hsehold .0478 1.2135 .9925
All households .0473 1.2485 .9873
Formula:
Source:
Data:
R = 0( +B (})
All Boston SMSA renters from the 1970
Census
Based on group data stratified by $2,000
increments. The data base is shown in
Table IV-2.
All coefficients are significant at .01 level.
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though it is hard to explain these findings, they suggest
that 2 to 5 person households are relatively inelastic to
their incomes with regard to their housing expenditures.
To confirm the above argument and also to see varia-
tions of income elasticities by income changes, income
elasticities of each type of household by three levels of
income of $5,000, $10,000 and $15,000 have been computed,
and are shown in Table 111-6. This table confirms the
existence of low elasticities among 2 to 5 person house-
holds. The table also suggests considerably low income
elasticities for all households, since none of the elasti-
cities exceeds the .5 level. Because this study is based
on current income, the elasticity estimates will be below
those based on permanent income (see Section II-A-l-b and
Section III-A-2-b).
To get a rough idea of permanent income elasticities,
we could increase those elasticities in the Table 111-6 by
20 percent.based on the hypothesis stated in the Section
III-A-2-c and estimates by Carliner.15
Even when increased by 20 percent, the income elastici-
ties of this study are still low. Only one elasticity in
Table 111-6 exceeds the 0.5 level.
1 5G. Carliner, "Income Elasticity of Housing Demand,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 1973.
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TABLE 111-6
INCOME ELASTICITY BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND BY ANNUAL INCOME
Household Type Income Elasticity by Annual Income
$5,000 $6,000 $15,000
1 Person household .2046 .3398 .4356
2 Person household .1517 .2635 .3493
3 Person household .1060 .1917 .2624
4-5 Person hsehold .1148 .2059 .2800
6-7 Person hsehold .1645 .2826 .3714
All household .1593 .2748 .3624
Data Base: Table 111-5
Computation: The regression equation in Table 111-5 is
R/Y = QX+ B( ).
Multiplying it by Y leads to R = B +CA-Y.
dR
Therefore, an income elasticity d
dR.Y Y
dY.R B+ QtY
is
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III-C-2. Effects of household size
The average effects of household size on rent-income
ratios, using all renters in the Boston SMSA, are illustra-
ted in Figure 111-9. Adding households headed by non-white,
female, or aged persons to those used in Figure 111-5 did
not change the pattern of rent-income ratios and households
size relationships: namely, for high-income households,
size has no effect on the average rent-income ratios, and
for low-income households, size does have positive effects
until the sizes reach three persons per household, after
which household size has a negative effect.
}
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R/Y(Rent-Income Ratio)
Households with
income of
2-3K
Y(Annual Income
$2,000-3,000)
e 3-4K
.---
*5-6K
6-7K
78K
10-1K- 9-10K
*13-14K
15-16K
S(Household Size)
3 4 5 6 (persons/Householdl
Figure 111-9. Rent-Income Ratio by Household Size
Stratified by Annual Income.
For all Boston renters excluding households
with income below $2,000.
R(Entry): 11S E :S199.
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40 1-
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IV. CONCLUSION
IV-A. Conclusions on Housing Consumption Patterns of
Renter Household
Based on the study of renters in Boston SMSA and the
review of past studies, the following conclusions about the
relation between housing consumption and household charac-
teristics are obtained. These final conclusions are illus-
trated in Table IV-1.
Rent-income ratios and household income are inversely
related, and the relation between income and rent-income
ratio is hyperbolic. The formula that best fits the data
is most likely of the form:
R/ = a + b -( ), (4.1)
where
R/y = rent income ratio of a type of household
whose income is Y
Y = income
a,b,c = coefficients.
This formula, however, cannot be specified by linear regres-
sion analyses. An alternative form that works well is
R/ = a + b.('). (4.2)
This formula is slightly better than the formula of
R/= a'.- 1 ), (4.3)
Y
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Table IV-l. Conclusions about Housing Consumption
and Household Characteristics.
Rent-Income Ratio -Relation is hyperbolic.
vs. Income R
y
4.7"_
- 0 Y
-There is an intercept.
R
$1,250
Y
-The best fit equation is most likely to be
R a + b(1
-Better regression formula is
Y a + b( )
rather than
R 1
for households with income over
42,000 and less than $20,000.
Although the difference between two
equations is slight and both fit well
to the data, for multiple regression
analysis, a linear formula rather
than a log-linear formula will serve
well.
/
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Table IV-1 (continued)
Income Elasticity
vs. Current Income
and vs. Household
Size.
Rent-Income Ratio
vs. household Size.
-The regression formula for all renters
in Boston SMSA is
R =_ 0473 + 1.248(i)
where R and Y are measured in
$1,000.
-Elasticities may well vary as a func-
tion of income.
-Elasticities are considerably low
ranging.from .1 to .5 as incomes change
from $5,000 to $15,000.
-Elasticities are high for 1 person or
6 or more person households, and are
relatively low for 2 to 5 person
households.
-As a whole sizes have little effects
on rent-income ratios compared to the
effect of income.
-Household size is influencial for
households with incomes under $6,000.
-Relation is polimonial.
R
-low income s Z6,000
-middle
high
3
Size
)
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Table IV-1 (continued)
-For low income households, 2 to 5
person households have higher ratios.
R R2-5P 1P or 6-7P"
AlP or 6-7P 2-5P,
-For multiple regressions, the results
suggest distinguishing the data by
sizes of 1,2 to five and 6 or more
person households, or inserting an
interactive term of income and size
(a . ).
Race and Sex vs. -As a whole, race and sex have little
Rent-Income Ratio. effect on rent-income ratios.
-For low income households with income
below $8,000, race and sex have
effects on rent-income ratios.
-White female headed household pay
rents higher than average, while non-
white female headed household pay
below average rents.
-Effects of nonwhite female heads may
well not be significant, because
much of this difference is explained
by the high incidence of nonwhite
female headed households in public
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Table IV-1 (continued)
I
Rent-Income Ratio
vs. Age of Head
housing.
-Public housing has significant cont-
ribution to lowering the rent-income
ratio of nonwhite female headed house-
holds.
-Male
have
R
Y
headed households of both sexes
similar rent-income ratios.
White Female
All Male
Nonwhite Female
Y
-For multiple regressions, distinguish-
ing by sex and race, especially by
white females, nonwhite female and
all males, is suggested.
-Alternatively two interactive terms
of race and sex are required.
However all such terms may well not
be significant.
-For highincome households over
$10,000, the age of the head of house-
hold has no effect or only slight
negative effect. For lowincome-bouseholks
under $10,000, the age of the head
has negative effect until age 60, and
I
1Table IV-1 (continued)
thereafter it has a positive effect.
R The highest
lowincomes< $10,000
The lowest
highj -Incomes 'oc
Age
60
Y : Age 545
"5Age 2 65
145 < Age!! 65
Y
-For multiple regressions, distinguish-
ing by either age groups or by
incomes(devided into "under *410,000
and "over $10,00d)is suggested.
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for households with an income of from $2,000 to $20,000.
For all renters in Boston SMSA, regardless of household
characteristics, the equation (4.2) is specified as
R/Y = .0473 + 1.248(1), (4.4)
where
rents (R) and incomes (Y) are measured in
$1,000.1
Note that (4.4) implies a rent of $1,248 plus 4.7 percent
of the household's income. The fit for equation (4.3) had
an R2 of .97 instead of .99 (again, using aggregated data
from Table IV-1). The fitted equation (4.3) implied a
constant income elasticity, but fitted value was again low
(about 0.20) and included in the range implied-by (4.4).2
The income elasticities found in this study are very
low as compared to the results of studies by Reid and Eka-
nem, but are comparable to implied elasticities by the study
of Lowry. For all households with incomes of from $5,000
to $15,000, income elasticities range from 0.11 to 0.44.
For households with income of $10,000, income elasticities
are about .20, which is very low. Because this study was
based on current and not permanent income.
Household size also has an effect on income elasticity3
1 See Table 111-5.
2See Table 111-6.
3See Table II-6.
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Income elasticity decreases as household size increases up
to three-person households by .10 to .18; however, income
elasticity increases again as household size increases
more than three persons.
Deviating from the analyses by Lowry* household sizes,
sex and race of head, and age of head have effects on rent-
income ratios only for households with low-and moderate-in-
comes less than $10,000 or $6,000. These characteristics
have almost no effect on the rent-income ratio for those
with high incomes.
In regard to households headed by a female, white
female heads have a positive effect on rent-income ratios,
while non-white female heads could have a negative effect
or at least have no positive effect. In the Boston SMSA
data, public housing had the significant effect of lowering
the rent-income ratio of non-white female-headed households;
as a consequence, the results of this study (under the ef-
fects of public housing) show clear low rent-income ratios
for non-white female-headed households.
IV-B. Facts: How Much Rent Tenants Are Paying
In addition to housing consumption patterns, actual
facts on how much rent tenants are paying is a major inter-
est of this study. The rent-income ratios by which renters
are paying can be estimated by two methods.
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One is by cross-tables themselves constructed from
the Public Use Sample of the 1970 U.S. Census. The table
which shows rent-income ratios by household size and by in-
come class is shown in Table IV-2. This table shows an
average rent-income ratio by which each type of household
paid their rent in 1969, regardless of household character-
istics such as age, sex, or race of head. These data were
used in the graphs in Figure III-7-A and-B and in Figure
111-8.
Another method of estimating rent-income ratios is
the regression equations shown in Table 111-5. These equa-
tions give us more internally consistent estimates of rent-
income ratios than those derived from Table IV-2
The procedure to obtain a rent-income ratio is as
follows:
To estimate the rent-income ratio of a one-
person household with an income of $6,000,
for instance, the equation which should be
used is
R/ = .0587 + 1.1407(l),
where
R,Y = annual rent and income, respectively,
measured in $1,000.
Substituting 6.0 (i.e., $6,000) for Y leads to R/ = .2488.
As a result, the average rent-income ratio of one-person
households with an annual income of $6,000 is estimated to
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TABLE IV-2.
RENT INCOME RATIO (%) BY INCOME AND BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE
-All Boston SMSA renters
-Excluding households with R/g Y100%
-Blanks in the table mean invalid data because
of R/ .:100% or too small entries in the cells
Y Household Size (Person/Hh)
Annual All
Indome 1P 2P 3P 4-5P 6-7P 8 or Renters
($) more
1.0-1999 60.24 62.79
2 k - 3 9 99 43.78 48.149 49.06 46.76 45.63 46.06
4 k -5999 29.10 31.62 33.02 30.76 30.34 30.63
6 k--7 9 99 21.74 23.43 23.47 23.24 22.27 22.87
8 k -9999 19.04 18.12 17.43 18.13 19.68 18.25
10 k-11 9 9 9  15.54 16.26 16.33 15.60 17.70 16.11
12k-13999 14.88 13.99 13.75 13.80 13.22 13.92
14 k-15 9 9 9 13.55 13.94 12.59 11.09 12.80
16 k-17999 13.00 11.01 11.36 12.12
18 k-19999 12.24 11.28 9.96 11.25
E CEntry) 154 E S354 87- E' 731
-4 t
Figure III-7-B Figure
111-8
Compar-
able
Graph
Figure
III-7-A
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be about 25 percent.
As one can see in Table IV-1 and in various other graphs
in this study such as III-1-A and -B or III-7-A and -B
households with incomes of less than $6,000 (about 41.8 per-
cent of all renters in the Boston SMSA) are predicted to pay
more than 25 percent of their gross income on rent, and those
with income less than $4,000 (about 26.7 percent of all ren-
ters in the Boston SMSA) are predicted to pay more than 40
percent.
IV-C. A Comparison of What Renters Pay and What Renters
Should Pay
To see approximately how many families of each house-
hold size experience rent burden, a comparison of what house-
holds are paying and what they should pay was done. Its
results are shown in Table IV-3. The data of what house-
holds are paying were obtained from my study (that is, Table
IV-1) and expressed by percentage rent-income ratios. The
data of what they should pay were based on Income Available
for Rent (1971) proposed by Matt Hobbs in Massachusetts
14Housing Finance Agency. and were expressed by percentage
rent-income ratios using gross annual income. For conven-
ience, it is assumed that what they should pay in 1971 can
4One who has interests in this should refer to
Matt Hobbs, Memorandum: Idealized Housing Subsidy Program,
1972.
TABLE IV-3.
COMPARISON OF WHAT TENANTS ARE PAYING AND WHAT TENANTS SHOULD PAY
Gross Income by $1,000 Households
Persons_ _with
Persons Rent
per Burden(
Household 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 18-19
1 P Hh.,
Are Paying .44 .29 .22 .19 68.1
Should Pay .00 .03 .15 .23 .25 .25 .25
2 P. Hh.-
Are Paying .48 .32 .23 .18 .16 51.9
Should Pay .00 .03 .12 .19 .24 .23 .24 .24 .24
3 PR Hh.3
Are Paying .49 .33 .23 .17 .16 .14 59.6
Should Pay .00 .08 .15 .20 .22 .22 .23 .23 .23
4mRnH h-
Are Paying .47 .31 .23 .18 .16 .14 .11 63.9
Should Pay .00 .06 .12 .17 .21 .21 .22 .22
5 P. Hh.,
Are Paying .47 .31 .23 .18 .16 .14 .11 68.6
Should Pay .00 .05 .10 .15 .19 .21 ___.21 .21
6 P. Hh.,
Are Paying .46 .30 .22 .20 .18 .13 .13 78.1
Should Pay .00 .05 .07 1 .14 .17 .2_0 _0 20
7 P. H h.,
Are Paying .46 .30 .22 .20 .18 .13 .13 85.4
Should Pay .00 .03 .08 .12 .15 .18 .19 .20
Entries are rent-income ratios
Sources: What tenants are paying is based on Table IV-1.
What tenants should pay is based on Income Available for Rent (1971) proposed by
Matt Hobbs (MRFA)
-.4
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be applicable to 1969.
One can say that a household paying higher rent than
he should pay is experiencing rent burden. The solid dark
line in the table shows separation of rent burden from non-
rent burden. Using this line and the Table ]1-1, which
shows numbers of households in every cell, one can compute
how many households out of all households with a certain
household size are experiencing rent burden. The results
are shown in the last column of Table IV-3. For example,
68.1 percent of one-person households are experiencing rent-
burden. Similarly, 85.4 percent for seven-person households.
The results suggest that most of renter households are ex-
periencing rent-burden.
This short analysis has shown one of many ways of how
the results of this study can be used.
IV-D What Was Done in This Study and What Remains to Be
Researched
IV-D-1 What was done in this study
In this study, patterns of housing consumption among
rental households and the rent-income ratios by which ren-
ters pay their rent have been examined. A set of housing
consumption patterns and the rent-income ratios of Boston
renters have been specified.
It should be noted, once more, that the above conclu-
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sions are based on specific conditions. First, all analyses
on Boston renters were based on current income as an income
concept. As suggested in several sections, time series per-
manent income is a more appropriate income concept than cur-
rent income. Current income tends to overestimate rent-
income ratios of low-income households and to underestimate
those of high-income households. As a consequence, use of
current income tends to underestimat overall elasticities
of housing expenditures.
Secondly, it also should be remembered that the analy-
ses of Boston renters were done for the whole SMSA, and data
disaggregated by geographical areas were not studied. In
other words, the price elasticity of housing expenditure in
Boston SMSA was assumed to be unity. However, price elasti-
city has not yet been proved to be 1.0, estimates of price
elasticity vary widely among different studies from 0.7 to
1.5.5 If the price elasticity of Boston SMSA is significant-
ly different from 1.0, then analyses based on the entire
SMSA, as a whole, would be distorted by the geographical con-
centration of any type of household. For instance, aged
households could be concentrated in the central business
district where housing price is supposed to be high. These
5 DeLeeuw, "The Demand for Housing: A Review of Cross-
Section Evidence." The Review of Economics and Statistics,
February, 1971, p. 9.
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high prices would then cause high rental expenditures of aged house-
holds, and consequently, would cause high income ratios. 'Thus,
geographical aggregation c6uld cause biases in estimating rent-
income ratios. Thirdly, the Boston analysis was done based on
averages of individual rent-income ratios, which are grouped by income.
IV-D-2. What remains to be researched
Although several simple regressions were run, a direct
consequent step which should be pursued in the next study
is a multiple regression analysis based on the various
suggestions in Section IV-A and based on individual data.
This step is necessary to confirm the significance levels
of the qualitative conclusions contained in Section IV-A
and to quantify the qualitatively expressed relations in
the conclusion. This study has generated sufficient infor-
mation and bases for specification of regression models.
A further step after the quantification by multiple re-
gression is an exploration of implications of the results
on housing policies. Possible implications are: 1) sug-
gestions on maximum contribution rates by which tenants
should pay for their rents by themselves; 2) assessment
of participation possibility of renters in any proposed
housing policy with specific contribution rate such as the
one shown in Section IV-C; and 3) measurement of rent bur-
den given criteria from other researches.
Each of these topics could be an independent study
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theme. It is sincerely hoped that this study will help in
creating more equitable and more rational housing assistance
policies.
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APPENDIX A: ADJUSTMENT OF OBSERVED RENT-INCOME RATIOS IN
ORDER TO EXCLUDE THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC HOUSING
As mentioned in Section III-B-2-b, public housing has
an effect to decrease the rent-income ratios for low-income
households who paid more than 25 percent of their income on
rent. Especially the public housing in the Boston SMSA
could have strong negative effect on the rent-income ratios
of non-white female-headed households whose income is below
'$6,000 (As one sees in Figure 111-3, non-white female-head-
ed households with income below $6,000 paid over 25 per-
cent).
In order to find the true effects of sex and race of
heads on rental expenditure, effects of the public housing
have to be eliminated from the observed rent-income ratios.
The exclusion procedure of the public housing effects are
illustrated in the tables from A-1 to A-7. A key table
is A-3, which shows the probabilities of living in the pub-
lic housing for renters with income below $6,000 by race
and sex of head. Tables A-1 and 2 compute necessary data
for calculating the probabilities in Table A-3, the proba-
bilities which were represented by p(P) in the equation
(3.6). For convenience, (3.6) is rewritten here with small
modification as
= 1R - 1R(P)'p(P)
-. (A.)
1 - p(P)
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TABLE A-1
COMPUTATION OF NUMBER OF RENTER HOUSEHOLDS WITH INCOME BELOW
$6,000 AND WITH HEAD OF MALE AND FEMALE, IN THE CITY OF BOSTON
Renter Households
At all in- With income With Y - With Y
come levels under $6,000 $6,000 $6,000
(1) =(l)xR headed by headed by
=(2) male female
=(2)x(l-R 2) =(2)xR 2
=(3) =-(4)
All renters 158,400 66,528 33,929 32,599
white headed
renters 129,300 54,3o6 27,696 26,610
Non-white
headed
renters 29,100 12,222 6,233 5,989
all renters with income under
all renters
170,600 = 0.42407,600
in 1969,
in Boston
SMSA
all renters with income under $5,000
R headed by female
2 all renters with income under $5,000
Data sources:
'I,
in 1969
in Boston
68 ,322 0.49
140,129 = 04
(1): Table H-1, Census Tract, Boston SMSA,
PHC (l)-29, U.S. Census, 1970
Table A-3, Metropolitan Housing Charac-
teristics, -Boston SMSA, HC(2)30, U.S.
Census, 1970
Table A-7, Metropolitan Housing Charac-
teristics, Boston SMSA, HC(2)30, U.S.
Census, 1970
It is assumed that a half of one-person
households were female.
where
R =
R 2 :
TABLE A-2
COMPUTATION OF NUMBER OF RENTER HOUSEHOLDS IN PUBLIC HOUSING WITH INCOME BELOW $6,000
AND WITH HEAD OF MALE AND FEMALE, IN THE CITY OF BOSTON
Renter Households in Public Housing
Headed by Headed by Headed by Headed by With income
male at all Female at male with female with below $6,000
income all income income below income be- (13)+(14)=(15)
levels (11) levels (12) $6,000 low $6,000
(ll)xR 3=(13) (12)xR3=(14)
All renters 3394 5354 2681 4230 6911
White headed
renters
Non-white head-
ed renters
2239 2600 1769 2054 3823
I 4 I I
1155 2754 912 2176 3088
where
R _ all households in public housing with income below $6,0003 ,, all households in public housing
6838 0.79
=8708 =07
as of
1970
Data sources: (11), (12): Table"Head of Household by Race as of 1970,"
constructed by Mr. Saffadini, Boston Housing
Authority
R 3 Table "Anticipated Income by Number of Workers
as of 1970," constructed by Mr. Saffadini,
Boston Housing Authority .
I-'
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TABLE A-3
PROBABILITY OF LIVING IN PUBLIC HOUSING FOR RENTERS WITH IN-
COME BELOW $6,000 BY RACE AND SEX OF HEAD, IN THE CITY OF
BOSTON
Renter household
With income With Y< $6,000 With Y ! $6,000
below $6,000 headed by male headed by
=(15)/(2)= =(13)/(3)=(23) female
(22) =(14)/(4)=(24)
All renters .10 .08 .13
White headed .07 .06 .08
renters
Non-white
headed02.1 3
renters .25 .15 -36
Data sources: (15), (13), (14): Table A-2.
(2),(3),(4): Table A-1,
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For explanation of the variables, look at the explanation
of (3.6). Observed or measured rent-income ratios (that
are ]R in the equation A.1) in tables A-4 and A-6 are adjus-
ted by the probabilities in Table A-3 (that are p(P) in
(A.1)) based on the equation (A.1), generating adjusted
rent-income ratios (that are ] ) in tables A-5 and A-7.
Two tables A-4 and A-5 are the original data for Table
III-4-A, and two tables A-6 and A-7 for Table III-4-B.
Because of imperfections of available data, this ad-
justment procedure stands on numerous assumptions, major
ones of which are discussed in the following section: 1) It
was assumed that participation rates of renters in the pub-
lic housing in the City of Boston could be applicable to
the entire Boston SMSA. In other words, the probabilities
of living in the public housing for renters with income
below $6,000 in Boston city (shown in Table A-3) were as-
sumed to be the same as those in the Boston SMSA. 2) In
the computation in Table A-1, it was assumed that the ra-
tio of renters with income below $6,0,00 to all renters in
the SMSA could be applicable to the ratio in the City of
Boston. 3) At the same time, it was also assumed that the
ratio of renters with income below $5,000 headed by females
to those headed by persons of any sex in the SMSA can be
applicable to the ratio of renters with income below $6,000
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TABLE A-4
AVERAGE RENT-INCOME RATIOS OF ALL RENTERS WITH INCOME FROM
$4,000 TO $6,000 BY RACE AND SEX OF HEAD, IN THE BOSTON SMSA
Headed by male Headed by female
(33) (34)
White headed renters .32 .35
Non-white headed renters .31 .26
Data sources: (33), (34): A cross-table based on
uncontrolled data of all
renters in the Boston SMSA
derived from Public Use
Sample, 1970 U.S. Census of
Housing, using the EFFECT
program of MIT.
TABLE A-5
ADJUSTED RENT-INCOME RATIO OF ALL RENTERS WITH INCOME FROM
$4,000 TO $6,000 BY RACE AND SEX OF HEAD, IN THE BOSTON SMSA
Headed by male Headed by female
_(33)-(23)x(.25)-(43) ~(34)-(24)x(.25)_( 4
(1.0-(23)) (1.0-(24))
White headed
renters .325 .359
Non-white headed
renters .321 .266
Data sources: (33), (34): Table A-4.
(23), (24): Table A-3.
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TABLE A-6
AVERAGE RENT-INCOME RATIOS OF ALL RENTERS WITH INCOME FROM
$2,000 TO $4,000 BY RACE AND SEX OF HEAD, IN THE BOSTON SMSA
Headed by male Headed by female
(53) (54)
White headed renters .53 .50
Non-white headed
renters N.A. .42
N.A.: Invalid data because of a too-small entry.
Data sources: (53), (54): Ibid., look at the
data source of Table A-4.
TABLE A-7
ADJUSTED RENT-INCOME RATIO OF ALL RENTERS
$2,000 TO $4,000 BY RACE AND SEX OF HEAD,
WITH INCOME FROM
IN THE BOSTON SMSA
Headed by male Headed by female
- (53)-(23)x(,25) - (54)-(24)x(.25)
(1-(23)) (1-(24))
= (63) = (64)
White headed renters .548. .522
Non-white headed
renters N.A. .516
Data sources: (53), (54): Table A-6.
(23), (24): Table A-3.
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headed by females in the City of Boston. 4) And was also
assumed that the two ratios described in 2) and 3) have no
differences between white-headed and non-white headed
households,. 5) In the computation in Table A-2, it was also
assumed that the number of renters in the public housing in
1970 were good estimates of those in 1969 for the City of
Boston. 6) It was assumed that the ratio of renters in the
public housing with income below $6,000 to all renters in
-the public housing had no difference between white-headed
and non-white-headed renters. Finally, 7) in the computa-
tion in tables A-5 and A-7, it was assumed that all renters
in the public housing in the City of Boston paid 25 percent
of their gross annual income on rent, and that 8) probabili-
ties of living in public housing for renters with income
below $6,000 could be applicable to those for renters with
income from $2,000 to $4,000 and also for renters with in-
come from $4,000 to $6,000.
Although there were lots of assumptions described
above,,. the results in tables A-5 and A-7 are the best es-
timates of rent-income ratios.excluding the effect of pub-
lic housing, because of imperfect data. As discussed in
III-B-2, at the income level of $4,000 to $6,000, non-white
female-headed households show fairly low rent-income ratios,
while, at the income level of $2,000 to $4,000, those house-
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holds do not show a significant difference from white fe-
male-headed households.
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